Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2000

Trade Secrets and Mutual Investments
Gillian L. Lester
Columbia Law School, glester@law.columbia.edu

Eric L. Talley
Columbia Law School, etalley@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Law and Economics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Gillian L. Lester & Eric L. Talley, Trade Secrets and Mutual Investments, USC LAW SCHOOL, OLIN RESEARCH
PAPER NO. 00-15; GEORGETOWN LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO. 246406 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1231

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

USC Law School
Sponsored by the John M. Olin Foundation
Olin Research Paper No. 00-15

Georgetown University Law Center
Business, Economics, and Regulatory Policy
Law and Economics Research Paper No. 246406

Trade Secrets and Mutual Investments

Gillian L.L. Lester
Eric L. Talley

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=246406

Trade Secrets and Mutual Investments∗
Gillian Lester†

Eric Talley‡

October 2000
Preliminary Draft

Abstract
This paper employs an optimal contracting framework to study the
question of how courts should adjudicate disputes over valuable trade secrets (such as customer lists). We focus principally on contexts where
trade secrets are formed endogenously, through specific, non-contractible
investments that could potentially come from either employers or employees (or both). Within such contexts, we argue, an “optimal” trade
secret law diverges in many important respects from existing doctrine. In
particular, an optimal doctrine would (1) expressly consider the parties’
relative skills at making value-enhancing investments rather than the mere
existence of a valuable informational asset; (2) tend to favor ‘weak’ entitlements (such as fractional property rights and/or liability rules) rather
than undivided property rules; and (3) frequently have a dynamic structure that progressively favors employees during the lifetime of the disputed
asset. Moreover, we argue, the considerations implicit in such a doctrine
are relatively simple, and need not impose prohibitive administrative costs
on either the parties or on courts.

1

Introduction

Lurking in the shadow of today’s highly mobile, highly skilled labor force, an
old question has taken on renewed importance: Who owns valuable information
generated within the workplace? The resurgence of this question is, in many
ways, only mildly surprising. Indeed, in contrast with the traditional conception
of the employment relationship, it is increasingly common for both employers
and employees to stake legitimate ownership claims to such information. Consider, for example, the (almost canonical) case of a detailed customer list for
∗ This paper was prepared for the Georgetown Conference on Contracts with Highly Skilled
Workers (Nov. 3-4, 2000). Many thanks to Jennifer Arlen and Lynn Stout for helpful discussions, and to the Sloan Foundation for generous Þnancial support. All errors are ours.
† Sloan Research Fellow and Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center; Professor
of Law, UCLA Law School.
‡ Sloan Research Fellow and Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center; Professor
of Law, USC Law School.
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a business that matches up highly skilled workers with customers possessing
idiosyncratic preferences and needs.1 Once the employee has amassed and nurtured a regular clientele base, she may be tempted to forge ahead on her own,
soliciting the patronage of those customers with whom she worked (and perhaps even some with whom she did not). The erstwhile employer, alarmed at
the prospect of losing its installed goodwill (and anxious to deter future appropriations), may attempt to enjoin such actions, alleging that the employee has
wrongfully appropriated trade secrets that took both time and eﬀort to build.2
If, as is often the case, a court is eventually called upon to clarify the parties’
respective rights and obligations, situations such as this can prove to be exceedingly diﬃcult to adjudicate: In the above example (as in a signiÞcant number
modern trade secret disputes), both the employer and the employee may take
partial credit for important (but unveriÞable) investments in value-enhancing
information, especially consumer goodwill. To simplify a bit, one might think of
such investments as falling within two principal categories: (1) “aggregate” investments (such as advertising, product packaging, or market research), which
tend to attract new customers; and (2) “individuated” investments (such as
the enthusiasm, attentiveness, or quality of work done by the service provider),
which tend retain the loyalty of existing customers. Either of these categories of
investment – or both in combination – can eﬀectively enhance brand loyalty
for an individual consumer. Moreover, casual observation suggests that, at least
on the whole, aggregate investments are usually borne by the employer while
individuated investments are borne by the employee. In such circumstances,
deciding who among the investing parties has the greater claim of residual ownership is no simple matter.
Courts have not been completely insensitive to the dilemma described above.
For example, a number of jurisdictions attempt to make doctrinal distinctions
between “route” and “non-route” customers for purposes assessing trade secret status.3 A “non-route” customer is one who tends to purchase from a
number of diﬀerent suppliers, and exhibits little brand loyalty (such as a long
distance telephone customer). Here, courts have recognized (at least implicitly) that nonroute customers – virtually by deÞnition – possess a willingness
to purchase that is insensitive to anything other than price. As such, speciÞc
investments in enhancing customer goodwill within such industries are unlikely
to prove eﬀective or durable. Consequently, courts have felt conÞdent in favoring preferences for market competition over concerns for protecting speciÞc
investments, and have routinely denied trade secret protection to employers.
In contrast, “route” customers tend to purchase repeatedly and exclusively
from the same supplier. Implicit in this repeat interaction is some propensity
toward brand loyalty, and thus a potentially high value of investments in goodwill. In contexts involving route customers, one might surmise (correctly, as
1 See,

e.g., Town & Country House & Home Services, Inc. v. Newberry, 3 NY2d 554 (1958).
the title of this paper refers to ‘trade secrets,’ our analysis carries over to a
number of related informational assets generated at the Þrm that might be used by a departing
employee to compete.
3 See Section II, infra.
2 Although
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it happens) that courts would be more willing Þnd that a trade secret exists.
However, as seems evident even in the case law, there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in the factual premises of such cases: consumer loyalty may well
be fostered principally by employer-borne investments in some situations, but
employee-borne eﬀorts in others. Thus, while route-customer status may be a
good indication that a trade secret exists, it alone does not answer the ultimate
question of who should receive the rents that emanate therefrom. Nevertheless,
apparently untroubled by this fundamental indeterminacy, courts regularly cite
route customer status as a rationale for granting an employer protection.
Regardless of how a court arrives at its conclusion to protect such information, once it so decides the remedy for misappropriation is ubiquitously severe.
Indeed, most jurisdictions allow for the aggrieved party to obtain injunctive
relief, or – if such relief is infeasible – the plaintiﬀ may obtain a Þnancial
remedy calculated to disgorge the entire proÞt of the appropriating defendant
rather than simply oﬀset the loss of the plaintiﬀ.4 This combination of equitable
relief and gains-based remedy reßects a form of entitlement protection that (using the Calabresi-Melamed parlance) is much more akin to a property rule than
a liability rule.
This paper addresses the normative question of whether (and how) trade
secret and related doctrines should explicitly account for the sort of mutual
investment contexts described above. We argue that they should, and that the
requisite reforms for accomplishing the task, while perhaps considerable, are
worth our collective eﬀort.
Our methodological approach for studying the problem largely tracks an
optimal-contracting framework, deÞning an ‘optimal’ trade secret doctrine as
that which best mimics the terms of a joint-welfare maximizing contract between the parties.5 Analyzing a game-theoretic model of contracting within
this framework, we present the following arguments. First, so long as one assumes (plausibly, we think) that employer- and employee-borne investments are
not perfect substitutes for one another, it is generally impossible to come up
with a contract that gives rise to “Þrst-best” investments by both parties. The
intuition here is simple and well-known in the literature: no matter how the
marginal returns are split, they are still split. Hence, the employer and employee must share the marginal beneÞt of their individual investments while
bearing the entire marginal cost personally.6
Despite this endemic ineﬃciency, it is still important to ask which doctrine
(or doctrines) minimize the ineﬃciency that occurs in equilibrium. If courts
are constrained (as current practice suggests) to decide solely about whether to
award the employer with an undivided property right, we argue, the optimal
4 See, e.g., the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 3426 (2000) (et seq.). The
damages section of the code actually disaggregates the remedy into two parts: (1) a reasonable
royalty, plus (2) any provable unjust enrichment beyond the reasonable royalty. These two
elements are not mutually exclusive. Id.
5 There are, to be sure, other deÞnitions of optimality; but this one provides a useful
benchmark that is common in the literature. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd (1981).
6 See, e.g., Holmstrom (1982).
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doctrine would tend to do so only if the employer enjoys a suﬃciently large
comparative advantage vis à vis the employee in enhancing consumer goodwill.
Furthermore, there is no a priori reason to think that such considerations generally favor employers, particularly in contexts involving highly-skilled employees.
This last observation spawns a larger set of arguments on which we concentrate at greater length–arguments relating not only to whether an employer
should receive an entitlement to a trade secret, but also to what form of protection she should receive. Indeed, an optimal legal entitlement regime need not be
limited to choosing among undivided property rules. To the contrary, we show
that there are many circumstances in which an optimal contract would assign
some form of divided entitlement to the parties. Such divided entitlements may
take a number of forms, ranging from an outright Solomonic division of the disputed asset (when feasible), to probabilistic assignment, to protection through
a liability rule in which the employee eﬀectively receives a ‘call option’ over the
post-employment use of the trade secret. This implication stands in stark contrast with current doctrine, which prescribes much stronger remedial medicine,
consisting of either injunctive relief or a disgorgement remedy designed to deter
post-employment competition completely.7
Finally, we argue that an optimal trade-secret doctrine may be dynamic
rather than static in nature. In particular, we conjecture that “aggregate investments” (as deÞned above) are likely to be most critical early on in the
customer relationship, while “individuated investments” come to predominate
later on. If employers largely bear the former while employees bear the latter,
then one obvious implication is that trade secret law should progressively become less protective of the employer during the lifetime of the disputed asset.
Interestingly, current doctrine tends to militate at least partially in the opposite
direction, aﬀording greater protection to long-standing components of goodwill
than to recent ones.8
This is hardly the Þrst paper to consider trade secret protection from a
transaction cost perspective. Anton and Yao (1994), for example, consider
a model in which a capital-constrained inventor with no intellectual property
protection for her invention must negotiate with prospective investors who are
conceivably able to expropriate its value. They show that even in such extreme
circumstances, the inventor can still proÞt by disclosing her information to a
single purchaser, who is willing to remunerate her generously in exchange for
securing her silence toward other potential competitors. Their analysis, while
thought-provoking, says little about setting mutual incentives to create information, whether the lack of intellectual property rights is in any way optimal
from an eﬃciency perspective, or whether some forms of partial protection are
7 See

note 3, supra.
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s deÞnition of “trade secret” rests only on economic value and eﬀorts to maintain secrecy (e.g., Cal Civ. Code § 3462 et seq. (2000)),
a number of cases appear to hinge protection – at least in part – on the time and eﬀort
required to amass the knowledge initially. See, e.g., Town & Country House & Home Services,
Inc. v. Newberry, 3 NY2d 554; 170 NYS2d. 328; 147 NE2d 724 (NY 1958); Corroon & Black
v. Hosch, 109 Wis.2d 290 (Wis. 1982).
8 Although
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preferable to others.
Zábojnṍk (2000) analyzes trade secret protection in the context of a transactioncost environment. He argues that when trade secrets are distributed throughout
a Þrm’s hierarchy and easily communicable to competitors, an optimal organizational form may purposely leave certain “low level” trade secrets unprotected,
thereby allowing the Þrm to avoid ratcheting up salaries throughout its employee ranks (which would otherwise be necessary to deter defections). For the
same reason, Zábojnṍk argues, mid- and upper-level managers within the Þrm
may have the opposite incentive, and will over-protect the Þrm’s existing informational assets. Like Anton & Yao, however, Zábojnṍk’s analysis implicitly
assumes that trade secrets are simply unprotectible in court, and he therefore
does not consider the question of how the legal environment interacts with joint
investments in goodwill.
More closely related to our analysis is Aghion & Tirole (1994), which also
analyzes a model of two-sided investment in informational assets.9 Though their
framework is not expressly rooted in a trade secret context, they argue (as do
we) that an optimal property rights assignment turns on an analysis of who,
on the margin, is the most productive party at creating ‘value.’ Their analysis,
however, fails to capture two fundamental aspects of the usual legal environment
surrounding such disputes. First, Aghion and Tirole limit their attention to
alternative allocations where one of the parties always receives an exclusive
property right to the disputed asset. Such a framework is inconsistent with
a typical trade secret dispute, in which a judge must decide between granting
property rights to the employer on the one hand, or (essentially) not granting
any at all, permitting the employer and employee both to utilize the disputed
asset in subsequent competition.10 Second, Aghion and Tirole’s analysis is
devoted exclusively to identifying the correct entitlement holder, but says little
about how her entitlement should be protected (e.g., through injunctive relief
or damages). Our analysis employs a framework that both captures the more
germane aspects of legal disputes and allows for a court to choose among a wide
variety of entitlement forms (or even a combination thereof) as a means for
protection.
More generally, our principal arguments tap into a current academic dialogue
over the relationship between the protection of intangible assets and overall economic growth. Some U.S. jurisdictions (such as California) are widely thought
to provide relatively weak protection to workplace-generated information in the
face of an employee’s departure.11 A number of legal scholars (e.g., Gilson
9 Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. Econ. 1185
(1994)
10 Hyde (2000) has also articulated this criticism.
11 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §16600-16602.5 (prohibiting non-compete covenants beyond
those attached to sale of goodwill of a business, or upon dissolution of partnership or limited
liability corporation). See also Ala. Code §8-1-1; Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-2-113; Haw. Rev. Stat.
§480-4(c); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:921; Mont. Code. Ann §§28-2-703, 704; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§75-4; N.D. Cent. Code §9-08-06; Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §217.
It should be noted as well that many California Þrms appear to limit their exercise of even
those legal rights available to them under trade secret law, whether because of California juries’
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(2000); Hyde (2000)) have speculated that the success of Silicon Valley relative
to other high-technology industrial districts may be due (at least in part) to California’s weak restrictions on post-employment competition. The kernel of this
argument is that weak protection within “high velocity” labor markets–where
highly-skilled employees move ßuidly between Þrms taking ideas and innovations
with them–permits the rapid diﬀusion of information, leading to industry-wide
technological gains that arguably swamp the investment disincentives that weak
entitlements may engender.12 Our analysis contributes to this enterprise, but
not by arguing that weak legal protection enhances informational diﬀusion.
Rather, we argue that at least in contexts where mutual investments are important, ‘weak’ entitlements can actually catalyze aggregate investment itself, by
incentivizing employees.13
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper describes the law of
trade secret protection and restrictive covenants in greater detail, emphasizing
the prevailing judicial tests surrounding (i) when an employer may obtain protection over informational assets generated in the Þrm, and (ii) what remedy
usually protects that entitlement. This analysis (and the observations emerging therefrom) provide the doctrinal benchmark for Section 3, which explores
a game-theoretic model of contracting over the allocation over trade secrets.
We use this framework to illustrate how an ‘optimal contract’ might frequently
depart from existing doctrine. In particular, an optimal doctrine would expressly account for the relative skills of employers and employees in enhancing
customer goodwill. Moreover, such a contract would frequently employ various
types of ‘divided’ entitlements (noted above) to protect the entitlement rather
than undivided property rules. In fact, Section 3 goes even further, demonstrating that many divided entitlement choices are actually theoretical ‘duals’
of one another: that is, each of them could independently be used to support
an optimal contract. Section 4 considers a number of caveats and extensions of
the analysis, including a formalization of the duality argument and its doctrinal applications, an assessment of whether the doctrinal reforms we advocate
are administratively feasible, and the extension of our framework to a dynamic
context. Section 5 concludes. (An appendix to this paper contains all of the
pertinent proofs of the propositions stated in the main text).
reluctance to convict defendants except in the most clear-cut cases, or due to the reputational
costs of bucking norms that tolerate employee mobility (norms that may have emerged as
a result of the background rules pertaining to covenants). Gilson (2000) at 600-601; Hyde,
(2000), at 31-2.
12 Gilson (2000), at 608-609; Hyde (2000), at 29.
13 Importantly, our notion of ‘weak’ entitlements is not meant to imply that an optimal
contract would remove any liability for departing employees. For instance, as will become
apparent below, an optimal liability rule might impose strict liability on a competing former
employee, while simultaneously placing a ceiling on her exposure to damages.
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2

The Law Protecting Investments in Customer
Relationships

The law of agency imposes a duty of loyalty on an employee during the tenure of
the agency relationship. This duty prohibits, among other things, solicitation
of the employer’s customers.14 After departure from the Þrm, however, an
employee may, as a general matter, solicit the former employer’s customers,
unless it involves misappropriation of trade secrets or conÞdential information,
or breach of a non-compete covenant.15

2.1

Trade Secrets and ConÞdential Information

Trade secrets law governs a signiÞcant proportion of disputes between employers
and their former employees over rights to customer goodwill. Accordingly, the
Þeld has become somewhat statute-oriented in recent years. About two-thirds
of the states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), which deÞnes
a trade secret as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, of process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to , and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of eﬀorts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.16
Although a number of possible assets might fall within this deÞnition, customer lists are commonly recognized as an important component of a Þrm’s
trade secrets.17 The inclusion of customer lists, moreover, is by no means a
14 Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966); Jet Courier Service, Inc.
v. Mulei, 771 P. 2d 486, 495 (S. Ct. Colo. 1989); ABC Transnational Transport, Inc. v.
Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E. 2d 1299, 1305-06 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980); Duane Jones
Co, Inc. v. Burke, 117 N.E. 2d 237, 245 (N.Y. 1954); Mallory Factor, Inc. v. Schwartz, 536
N.Y.S. 2d 752 (1989).
15 Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfr. v. A-1-A Corp, 369 N. E. 2d 4 (N.Y. 1977); Cosmos
Forms Ltd. v. American Computer Forms, Inc., 596 N.Y.S. 2d 862 (1993) (citing Reed,
Roberts Assocs. v. Straumann, 353 N.E. 2d 590 (N.Y. 1976); Gordon Termite Control v.
Terrones, 148 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1978); Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E. 2d 1054, 1061 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1993); Gary Van Zeeland Talent Inc, v. Sandas, 267 N.W. 2d 242, 252 (Wis. 1978)
(citing American Welding & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Luebke, 155 N.W. 2d 576 (Wis. 1968).
16 Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1(4) (1985).
17 While our subsequent analysis Þts most conveniently into a ‘customer list’ category, any
piece of information that has either cost- or revenue-based implications, and whose value is
subject to dissipation by wide disclosure would Þt into our analytical framework.
Note that at least one state has modiÞed the UTSA deÞnition to include customer lists explicitly: Illinois deÞnes a trade secret as, “ information, including but not limited to, technical
or non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
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recent phenomenon: the Restatement (First) of Torts also memorialized the
recognition of customer lists as potential trade secrets.18
The critical inquiry for purposes of our analysis is whether and how courts
assess the parties’ respective contributions to the creation of goodwill in deciding
whether to recognize a trade secret, and thus whether to allow the employer
(as is typically the case) to enjoin the former employee’s appropriation of the
disputed intangible asset.19 As our discussion below illustrates, existing law does
not generally account for the relative importance of employee contributions in
developing such assets, but rather tends to hinge trade secret protection almost
exclusively on the existence of a valuable informational asset irrespective of how
it was generated.
Above all other things, trade secret status turns centrally on whether the
disputed asset has predominantly an informational value. Protection is generally unavailable unless the alleged trade secret contains information that is
not already known to members of the trade, or readily ascertainable through
public sources (e.g., telephone books and trade publications).20 In addition,
courts frequently also emphasize the eﬀort and expenditure on the part of the
employer in developing the list.21 To this end, evidence of signiÞcant employer
investment appears to serve as a type of doctrinal proxy for information that
drawing, process, Þnancial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers. . . ” . Ill.
Rev. Stat. Ch. 140 ¶352.
18 See Restatement (First) of Torts, §757, Comment (b) (a trade secret “ may be a formula
or chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.” ).
19 State common law idiosyncrasies have led to variations in the precise details of how courts
treat customer goodwill. Rather than exhaustively reviewing the approaches of the various
states, we will simply describe general trends.
20 See, e.g., Carbonic Fire Extinguishers Inc. v. Heath, 547 N.E. 2d 675, 677 (Ill. App.
1989) (rejecting plaintiﬀ’s request for trade secret protection on basis that information was
readily available) (citing the pre-UTSA case of Lincoln Towers Ins. Agency v. Farrell, 425
N.E. 2d 1034 (Ill. App. 1981) (noting the range of factors considered, but then noting that
the conÞdentiality factor must be present for there to be protection)); Ivy Mar Co., Inc. v.
C.R. Season, Ltd., 907 F. Supp. 547, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) Ivy Mar, id., 907 F. Supp. at
558 (citing Reed, Roberts, Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E. 2d 590, 54 (1976)). Also see
generally, Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law §3.05[6][b][I] (May 2000 update) (customer
list cases arising under the UTSA generally turn on meeting the requirement of not being
readily ascertainable); See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, §42, Comment (f)
(customer list may be protectible as a trade secret if information is suﬃciently valuable to
aﬀord economic advantage to the person who has access to the list, and if the potential
customers are not readily identiÞable without the list).
21 Courtesy Temporary Services, Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (1990); Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E. 2d 209, 241 (Ill. App. 1995), appeal denied,
N.E. 2d 639 (1995) (customer list was protectible based on the fact that the employer had
developed the list through laborious methods that required time, eﬀort and expense, that
no such list was readily available from any public source, and that the employer had made
reasonable eﬀorts to protect the secrecy and conÞdentiality of the list); Nalco Chemical Co.
v. Hydro Technologies, Inc., 984 F. 2d 801 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Gary van Zeeland Talent,
Inc. v. Sandas, 267 N.W. 2d 242 (Wis. S. Ct. 1978) (emphasizing both protection of secrecy
of list, and employer investment in developing list) CHECK THIS; Ivy Mar, id., 907 F. Supp.
at 556-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278 N.E. 2d 636, 639 (1972))
(customer lists protectible as trade secrets only where considerable time and eﬀort has been
invested in compiling the list of names, and the names are not readily ascertainable).
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gives the employer a competitive advantage vis à vis other providers. As a New
York district court recently emphasized:
[W]here years of business eﬀort, advertising, and enterprise have allowed the employer to secure the goodwill of customers whose availability as patrons would not be readily ascertainable from public
sources, the former employee may be enjoined from soliciting those
customers. 22
A particularly striking feature of this excerpt is the absence of any express
consideration of how (or whether) the eﬀorts of the employee potentially played
a role in developing the customer goodwill. To the contrary, it is often the case
that evidence of employee eﬀort actually buttresses the employer’s argument
for protection, usually based on the dual doctrinal premises that the employee’s
eﬀorts were eﬀectively ‘purchased’ by the employer, and that appropriation of
those special relationships would be an act of unfair competition by the former
employee.
These themes are particularly well drawn in jurisdictions that still recognize
what has become known as the “route / non-route” distinction. An early and
inßuential California precedent involving a ßoor treatment company seeking to
enjoin two former employees from using its customer list is typical.23 The employer was unable to secure trade secret protection in part because it failed
to demonstrate an established, regular relationship between the defendant employees and its customers. This was dubbed a “non-route” case because the
former employer competed openly for its clientele, rather than having secured
a select, brand-loyal group of customers through its “routemen.”24 By negative implication, an employer who can demonstrate that her customers were
“route” customers stands a signiÞcantly greater chance of securing trade secret
protection.
The route / non-route distinction seemed motivated by two principles. First,
the exclusivity of the client base was a surrogate for the conÞdentiality of the
information. Second, the involvement of the employee in “working” that trade
route permitted the employee to gain a unique or specialized type of knowledge
through the conÞdential relation with his employer, and thus the capacity to exploit that conÞdential knowledge unfairly for gain.25 Modern customer list cases
in California reveal their roots26 in the route/non-route analysis. The success
of a trade secret claim turns not only on whether the customer list is readily ascertainable by members of the trade, but also on whether the customer’s
decision to purchase was based primarily on consideration of price, quality, reliability and other generic competitive factors, or whether the decision instead
22 Ivy Mar, id., 907 F. Supp. at 557 (quoting American Institute of Chemical Engineers v.
Reber-Friel Co., 682 F. 2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1982)). GET CORRECT QUOTE
23 Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Mosely, 148 P. 2d 9 (Cal. S. Ct. 1944).
24 Id. at ??.
25 State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 344 P. 2d 821, 825 (Cal. App. 1959);
American Loan Corp. v. California Commercial Corp., 27 Cal. Rptr. 243, ??? (1963).
26 Pardon the pun.
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turned on the employer or employee’s knowledge, acquired through eﬀort, of a
particular idiosyncrasy of the customer’s preferences or needs.27 A few other
jurisdictions take a similar tack, holding that the more idiosyncratic knowledge
the employer has acquired about its customer’s tastes and purchasing habits,
the greater the prospects for trade secret protection.28
A point worth emphasizing here is that–at least among reported cases–the
customer-speciÞc information at the core of many disputes is often the product
of an employee’s individual dealings with the customer base over an extended
period of time. Indeed, even in states that do not explicitly follow a route /
non-route line of precedent, the intimate nexus between employee and customer
often biases a court towards granting trade secret protection to the employer.
In one recent New York decision, the employee’s own aﬃdavit that it was “due
to the rapport that she, as the plaintiﬀ’s employee, had developed with some of
the plaintiﬀ’s customers which induced them to become her customers,” convinced the court that the customer list could not, in fact, be readily ascertained
(a factor cutting in favor of trade secret protection).29 It is not unusual for
evidence of “friendly contact” between the former employee and the contested
customers to strengthen the employer’s claim for protection, not so much because the courts actively discredit the element of human capital investment in
those relationships to which the employee may rightly lay at least some claim,
but on the theory that a former employee’s use of his knowledge of customer
buying habits and requirements may constitute unfair competition.30 A small
number of jurisdictions have allowed for the possibility of exempting selected
names from a customer list from protection, based on the eﬀorts of the former
employee in developing personal goodwill with those customers.31 This practice
would seem to recognize the desirability of taking into account the respective
investments of the parties in deciding how property rights in customer goodwill
should be allocated.32 This alternative approach, however, does not seem (as
27 Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F. 2d 1324, 1332-35 (9th Cir. 1980)
(listing factors). [Þnd actual quote, or at least check to see paraphrase is correct]. Note that
in California, the decision also turns on whether the former employee, in addition to intending
to appropriate its customers, also intended to harm the former employer’s business.
28 See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp., 147 N.W. 2d 529, 539 (Wis. S.
Ct. 1967) (declined to protect the customer list in question as a trade secret, reasoning in part
that the list contained non-route customers. Court also held that customer lists are not trade
secrets unless they contain more than mere names and addresses: they must contain more
detailed information about the market needs and habits of the customers); Nalco Chemical,
id., 984 F. 2d 801 (citing Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W. 2d 773, 779 (Wis. S. Ct.
1989)) (anything in dicta saying that this is a modern version of route / non-route?); Colonial
Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332 (criticized on other grounds by Callahan v. Rhode
Island Oil Co., 103 R.I. 656 (19 ).
29 HBD, Inc. v. Ryan, 642 N.Y.S. 2d 913, 914 (1996). (COVENANT CASE — aﬃrmed
partial summary judgment on issue of former employee’s liability for breaching covenant not
to compete by working for former customers within a particular time and place).
30 See page 40 ALR Treatise. [Need more on this–cases go both ways in other jurisdictions
on “ friendly relationships.” ]
31 Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (citing King v. PaciÞc
Vitamin Corp., 64 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1967)).
32 Any language from Moss in this vein?

10

of yet) to have been adopted widely.33
Finally, even where customer information does not meet the deÞnition of
trade secret, an employee may be enjoined from soliciting her former employer’s
customers. In some cases, sustained eﬀort in developing the list may actually substitute for the requirement that the list be secret. Where the list was
compiled through sustained eﬀorts in investigating and soliciting customers,
whether by the employer or by the employee on behalf of the employer, it may
be conceived as a valuable asset over which the employer may legitimately seek
protection. A cause of action may lie in unfair competition, which recognizes a
duty to refrain from using information obtained during employment that would
give the employee an unfair advantage.34 The status of mere information about
customer idiosyncrasies (where the identity of the customer is available from
public sources) is, at present, more ambiguous. Some courts have held that an
employee cannot be enjoined from recalling and using details about the preferences and consumption habits of particular customers, so long as that information could be recalled simply by contacting the customer directly.35 Others have
held an employee liable for breach of the duty of conÞdentiality for “ referring
to his or her knowledge of their business acquired during the employment.”36
To summarize, in the main, neither trade secret doctrine nor the closely
linked doctrine of unfair competition prescribe any signiÞcant assessment of
the role and strength of the employer and employee investments in customer
relations. If a customer list is found to be a trade secret, is because–akin to
a secret recipe–it was not generally known to the public, and at some point
required a costly investment on the part of the employer both in terms of its
33 A recent Court of Appeal decision in California may signal a retraction of earlier common
law precedent under the UTSA. In Morlife v. Perry, the court indicated that if a customer
list is protectible as a trade secret, a former employee is prohibited from using the information contained in the list, regardless of whether that employee was personally responsible for
developing any of the customers during the period of employment. Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66
Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (1997).
34 See, e.g., Panther Systems II, Ltd. et al v. Panther Computer Systems Inc., 1991 WL
317029 (E.D.N.Y. November 29, 1991), p.13, (citing Abraham Zion Corp. v. LeBow, 593 F.
Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aﬀ’d 761 F. 2d 93 (2d Cir. 1985) (employer can enjoin a former
employee from soliciting customers if it can be shown that the employee would not have
known about the customers “ but for information obtained during his prior employment”
); Courtesy Temporary Services, Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 360 (noting that
even if customer list didn’t meet deÞnition of trade secret, unfair and deceptive practices of
employees in stealing plaintiﬀ’s customers should have been enjoined under California Business
and Professions Code, section 17200 et seq.) CHECK TO SEE IF THIS IS CURRENT OR
FORMER EES.
ALSO CHECK the following cases to see whether they recognize a stand-alone (no trade
secret and no covenant) basis for enjoining employee solicitation, and if so, what elements
are required for a cause of action: Continental Dynamics Corp. v. Kanter, 408 N.Y.S. 801
(1978); American Bldgs. Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Systems Inc., 392 SE 2d 860; Numed, Inc. v.
McNut, 724 S.W. 2d 432 (Tex. App. 19 ) (criticized on other grounds in Miller Paper Co. v.
Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W. 2d 593 (Tex. App. 19 ); Camden v. South Jersey Port Com,
63 A. 2d 552 (N.J. 19 ), mod on other grounds, 73 A. 2d 55; Byars v. Stone, 42 SE 2d 847.
35 Ivy Mar, 907 F. Supp. at 557-58; Walter Karl, Inc. v. Wood, 528 N.Y.S. 2d 94, 98 (1988);
Catalogue Services of Westchester, Inc. v. Henry, 484 N.Y.S. 2d 615, 616 (1985).
36 John Davis & Co. v. Miller, 104 Wash. 444, 177 P 323.
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development, and in terms of maintaining its secrecy. The employee’s role in
developing the asset is at best irrelevant, and at worst constitutes a factor that
augments the employer’s claim.

2.2

Covenants Not to Compete

Although our analysis revolves principally around default legal rules (in the
form of trade secrets law), it is perhaps prudent to brießy address the many
instances in which parties attempt to vary trade secret law through a covenant
not to compete.37 Viewed in this light, non-compete agreements regarding postemployment competition serve to supplement (or substitute for) trade secret
protections.38 Covenants not to compete are presumptively unenforceable on
public policy grounds, but the doctrine carves out an exception for a covenant
that safeguards a “ legitimate” or “ protectible” interest, and then only if the
covenant is reasonable. The reasonableness test balances hardship to the employee against the interests of the public, with speciÞc attention to whether the
restriction is excessive in terms of duration, range of activities, or geographic
scope.
Protectible interests that satisfy the Þrst prong of the test for enforceability
vary from state to state. Probably the most universally recognized protectible
interest is trade secrets. Customer goodwill may, as we have explained, be
characterized as a trade secret in some instances, thus satisfying the protectible
interest prong.39 Even where it is not a trade secret, customer goodwill may
be classiÞed as a legitimate employer interest and hence may be the subject
of a covenant not to compete. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the law to single out as protectible the goodwill that the departing employee him or herself
cultivated while employed by the former employer.40 This goodwill component
37 A minority of states, such as California, simply deem restrictive covenants unenforceable
by statute, though these statutes usually contain narrow exceptions. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code §16600-16602.5 (exceptions include covenants attached to sale of goodwill of a business,
or upon dissolution of partnership or limited liability corporation). See also Ala. Code §8-1-1;
Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-2-113; Haw. Rev. Stat. §480-4(c); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23:921; Mont.
Code. Ann §§28-2-703, 704; N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-4; N.D. Cent. Code §9-08-06; Okla. Stat.
tit. 15, §217.
38 For explanations of why employers might supplement existing trade secret rights with
contractual protections, see Kitch (1980) (arguing that the beneÞt of contractual protection
over trade secrets law is that a contractual prohibition on mobility enable the employer to keep
the former employee away from competitors in the Þrst place); and Rubin & Shedd (1981)
(use of contractual mechanisms may be a pragmatic response to the diﬃculty of knowing ex
ante whether information will be deemed a trade secret).
39 Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 634 N.E. 2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), vacated in part,
adopted in part, 652 N.E. 2d 507, 510-11 (courts will enforce a covenant to protect trade
secrets, so long as it meets other requirements of enforceability); Geritex Corp. v. Dermarite
Indus., LLC, 910 F.Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (protectible employer interests include
trade secrets and conÞdential customer lists). This is so even in some states, such as California,
that statutorily prohibit covenants not to compete. See, e.g., Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 836, 840 (1985) (blurb). More direct cites for this proposition?
40 Reynolds and Reynolds Co., v. Tart, 955 F. Supp. 547, 552-53, n.4 (W.D. N. C. 1997)
(noting that protectible ‘good will’ is established when an employee, during the course of his
or her employment, develops or improves customer relationships) GET SPECIFIC QUOTE

12

of the employee’s human capital is distinguished from general skills, knowledge
and expertise the employee acquired while working for the employer, including
general “ tools of the trade” acquired at the employer’s expense, which are usually not protectible.41 The basis for the distinction appears to be an extension
of the unfair competition principles discussed earlier: just as trade secrets are
protectible through covenant, the closely related right to be free from unfair
competition is also protectible through covenant.42
Some states add a caveat, conceptually similar to the route / non-route
distinction discussed earlier, that the employer cannot protect its interest in
customer relationships unless the relationships have an element of exclusivity.
Illinois courts, for example, recognize a legitimate business interest where “ customer relationships are near permanent and but for the employer’s association
with the employer the employee would not have had contact with customers.”43
Thus Illinois, like many states, singles out employers’ customer goodwill as meriting extended contractual protection, should the reach of trade secret or conÞdentiality doctrines somehow prove insuﬃcient. At the same time, it delimits
the range of customers protectible as such to those over whom the employer
has a de facto monopoly due to a long-standing relationship.44 Other states,
FROM CASE; IDS Life Insurance, Inc., v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1273 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (applying Minnesota law) (Minnesota employers have a distinctly protectible interest
in the customers their agents have been hired to develop); Renal Treatment Ctrs.–Missouri,
Inc. v. Braxton, 945 S.W. 2d 557, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (covenant not to compete
held unenforceable because it prohibited serving customers that the defendant had not had
contact with during the employment, and plaintiﬀ therefore had no protectible interest in
those customers as to the defendant).
41 Reed, Roberts Associates v. Strausman, 353 N.E. 2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (stating
that “no restrictions should fetter an employee’s right to his own best advantage the skills
and knowledge acquired by the overall experience of his previous employment“); Donahue v.
Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E. 2d 235, 240 (Ind. 1955) (“knowledge, skill and information
(except trade secrets and conÞdential information) become a part of the employee’s personal
equipment. . . . These things cannot be taken from him, although he may forget or abandon
them“) (citing Jewel Tea Co. v. Grissman, 279 N.W. 544 (1938)).
42 Daruger v. Hodges, 471 S.E. 2d 33, 35-36 (Ga. Ct App. 1996) (employer has a protectible
interest in the customer relationship its former employee established at work and a right
to protect itself from the risk that the former employee will use contacts so cultivated to
unfairly appropriate customers); Terry D. Whitten, D.D.S., P.C. v. Malcolm, 541 N.W. 2d
45, 48 (1995) (legitimate interest where employee has had signiÞcant personal contact with
employer’s patients and thus has the opportunity to abscond with former employer’s goodwill
in the form of patients).
43 Lawrence and Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resource Group, Inc., 685 N.E. 2d 434,
443 (Ill. App. 1997) (citing Capsonic Group v. Swick, 537 N.E. 2d 1378 (Ill. App. 1989));
Label Printers v. Pßug, 564 N.E. 2d 1382, 1387 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (protectible interest
where employer has “near-permanent“ relationship with customers with whom, but for the
employment, employee would not have encountered; “near-permanence“ is a function of, inter
alia, time, cost, and diﬃculty of developing and maintaining clientele, as well as continuity
and duration of relationship), citing Reinhardt Printing Co. v. Feld, 490 N.E. 2d 1302 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1986).
44 Opinion as to what constitutes a ‘near permanent’ relationship is divided in the lower
courts, although the so-called “ nature of the business” test, which emphasizes
, has
enjoyed recent popularity. Id., 685 N.E. 2d at 443-44; Oﬃce Mates 5, North Shore, Inc. v.
Hazen, 599 N.E. 2d 1072 (Ill. App. 1992).

13

however, have expressly rejected the near-permanence limitation.45
The reasonableness analysis is triggered only if the legitimate interest prong
is satisÞed, but it would be possible, in theory, for this analysis to incorporate
an assessment of relative contributions by the parties. The analysis could, for
example, invalidate a covenant designed to protect a customer list on the basis
of overbreadth if it prohibited solicitation of customers without regard to the
relative investments of the parties, as opposed to tailoring the prohibition to
customers with whom the former employee had no prior dealings or in whom
the employee had made insuﬃcient goodwill-enhancing investments. This, however, is not the case. While the reasonableness analysis may, in fact, take notice
of the employee’s particular dealing with the contested customers, the signiÞcance of such evidence cuts the other way. The doctrine reinforces the tendency
of courts to recognize stronger employer entitlements when the contested goodwill was developed partially by the employee. Thus, for example, courts have
held that a covenant is overbroad and unenforceable if it prohibits solicitation
of the former employer’s clients without any geographic restriction, but that the
absence of a geographic restriction is not fatal if in its place, the covenant limits
nonsolicitation to those clients with whom the employee had contact while still
working for the employer.46 This reÞnement of the geographic prong of the
reasonableness test puts a Þne point on our observation about the tilt of the
doctrine aimed at balancing employer and employee concerns in limiting workers’ post-employment activities. Not only does it fail to weigh the employee’s
potential contribution to the value of the investment, but it ratiÞes the parties’
decision to selectively protect only those customers with whom the employee
has had contact (and an opportunity to enhance the value of the goodwill).47

2.3

Remedies

As the above discussion illustrates, considerable uncertainty still imbues questions of when the employer possesses an entitlement to trade secrets generated
in the workplace, versus when the employee is entitled to use such knowledge
to compete with his erstwhile employer. Notwithstanding this uncertainty concerning the entitlement holder, however, there appears to be wide consensus
in the courts about the form of protection that the entitlement holder (once
decided) receives. Trade secret law (much like the rest of intellectual property
law) has remained unambiguously faithful over the years to using undivided
45 IDS Life Insurance, supra, 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1273 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (applying Minnesota
law).
46 Lawrence and Allen, supra, 685 N.E. 2d 434, 441 (Ill. App. 1997) (holding that a restrictive covenant barring employee from soliciting “ any client,” without geographic restriction,
was overbroad, noting that it should be limited to protecting those clients with whom the
employee had had the opportunity to develop a relationship); Digitel Corp. v. DeltaCom,
Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (Ala. 1996); Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Wilson, 953 F.
Supp. 1056, 1068 (Ia. 1996).
47 If one assumes that the employee’s compensation fully or partially adjusts for this ex-ante
allocation of downstream rights to clients, then this doctrinal feature will be of little or no
concern; on the contrary, the rule will be well tailored to the parties contractual intentions.
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property rules as a means for protecting entitlements. If a court denies trade
secret protection, then the employee may freely use the disputed knowledge to
compete with his erstwhile employer. On the other hand, if a court Þnds the
asset to constitute a protectible trade secret, the employer may exclude the
employee completely. Injunctive relief is far and away the most typical remedy in both trade secret and restrictive covenant litigation. Accordingly, it is
both permissible and commonplace for courts to award both injunctive relief
(prospectively) and a gains-based accounting in damages (retrospectively) for
proÞts wrongfully received due to the misappropriation.48 While this appears,
on Þrst blush, to be a mixed regime of property and liability rules, the breadth
and severity of retrospective remedies available seem clearly intended to deter
any future misappropriations. Indeed, in addition to recovery for unjust enrichment, a successful plaintiﬀ may also collect various other remedies, including
compensation for losses actually caused by the appropriation, punitive damages,
and (in some cases) attorney’s fees.49 It has been said that the wide variety
of situations that may develop in trade secret litigation require courts to be
ßexible and imaginative in devising remedies in damages.50 If this be the case,
then courts have succeeded admirably.
The existing preference for property rules seems motivated–at least in large
part–by a self-conscious awareness among judges of the evidentiary problems
manifest in attempting to compute damages accurately. Indeed, in the vast
majority of cases, courts have been sympathetic to plaintiﬀs’ claims that damages are simply inadequate to remedy the loss of a trade secret.51 The usual
argument is that the loss of the trade secret will eﬀectively let the “ cat out of
the bag,” causing the loss of prospective proÞts. In such situations, it may be
extremely diﬃcult to determine a remedy, both in terms of deciding an appropriate theory(ies) of damages (e.g., gains-based, loss-based, punitive), and in terms
of computing the sum implied by this theory with reasonable certainty.52 But
48 See generally, Jager, §§7.01. The UTSA §2, entitled “ Injunctive Relief,” provides that “
[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court, an
injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction
may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial
advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.”
49 The UTSA §3 makes clear that in addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief, the injured party
may seek damages for actual loss caused by misappropriation, as well as unjust enrichment
that is not taken into account in calculating damages. Where misappropriation is willful and
malicious, the court may order exemplary damages of up to double the amount of the total
monetary award. Attorney’s fees may be available if a claim on either side is made in bad
faith, or if misappropriation in willful or malicious (§4).
50 Jager, §7.03[2][a], citing University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F. 2d
518, 538 (15th Cir. 1974). Thus although damages may be based in tort or contract, courts
have sometimes blurred the conceptual distinctions between them, for example permitting
damages in a breach of contract action based on the gain to the employee, rather than the
loss of expected value to the employer. Prandl, (1987).
51 Casagrande (2000), at 124 (noting that many cases reßexively recite that theft of a trade
secret automatically inßicts irreparable harm, thus triggering injunctive remedies).
52 Pranle (1987), at 448.
The relationship between veriÞability and property rules is perhaps most salient in cases
of customer lists. Whether an employee can be enjoined from soliciting the customers of her
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whatever the motivation, the preference for property rules (when practicable)
is now a veritable axiom of trade secret law. As the Supreme Court articulated
in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.53 :
The right to exclude others is generally ‘one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.’ (citation omitted). With respect to a trade secret, the
right to exclude others is central to the very deÞnition of the property
interest. Once the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed
to others, or others are allowed to use that data, the holder of the
trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.” 54
As noted above, for restrictive covenants, injunction is also by far the most
common method of enforcement.55 Here, too, the diﬃculty of reliably measuring
damages often militates in favor of equitable remedies.56 Occasionally, however,
a restrictive covenant may be enforceable through liquidated damages. One
commentator recently noted, for example, that including a liquidated damages
clause in a restrictive covenant may make it easier to enforce.57 The existence
of a liquidated damages clause, however, does not serve as a bar to simultaneous
injunctive relief if an injunction is enforceable on its own terms (i.e., deemed
necessary to prevent irreparable harm58 ).
Although this has been a necessarily brief summary of trade secret law, we
conclude by underscoring a number of important observations about existing
doctrine. First, trade secret status frequently attaches to informational assets
whose value is enhanced by sustained, long-standing investments of either employers or employees (or both). Second, the relative importance of the employee
former employer turns on the usual equitable principles of injunction, which ask whether the
harm to the plaintiﬀ would be irreparable in the absence of an injunction, and whether the
remedy at law is inadequate. Jager, §7.01 (emphasis added). These criteria are frequently
satisÞed in cases, described earlier, in which no trade secret is involved, and yet the actions
of the former employee are deemed to be a breach of conÞdence and unfair competition. Id.
(Cite cases).
53 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
54 Id., at 1101 (cited in Jager, §7.02.)
55 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (X ed., 19
) §1446; Note, Economic
and Critical Analysis of the Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 Geo. L. J. 1425, 1428
(1984) [hereinafter Critical Analysis] (the great majority of actions for breach of covenant
not to compete seek injunction relief); O’Sullivan v. Conrad, 358 N.E. 2d 926, 929-30 (Ill.
App. 1976) (once there is a breach of covenant, injunctive relief follows almost as a matter of
course).
56 Note, Critical Analysis, id., at 1432-33.
57 Paul R. Kitch, Employee Noncompete and Nondisclosure Restrictive Covenants, 88 Ill.
B. J. 230, 232 (2000) (citing Torrence v. Hewitt Assoc., 493 N.E. 2d 74 (Ill. App. 1986), in
which the court noted when enforcing a liquidated damages clause in a restrictive covenant
that the absence of an injunction meant that there was no impairment of the employee’s right
to work and thus no injury to the public interest).
58 See, e.g., SSA Foods, Inc. v. Giannotti, 434 N.E. 2d 460, 463 (Ill. App. 19 ) (citing
). It should be noted, however, that some courts view the availability of a negotiated
liquidated damages term as a signal from the parties that capitalizes the expected harm
from an appropriation. See [cite]. Under such an interpretation, then, a liquidated damages
provision would likely disable a plaintiﬀ from obtaining injunctive relief.
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in building up such assets tends to play little or no role in awarding protection
to employers. Third, many jurisdictions allow parties to augment the protection aﬀorded the employer through express covenants not to compete. Fourth,
the most favored forms of entitlement protection in trade secret law consist of
undivided property rules rather than divided entitlements, such as “fractional”
ownership or liability rules.59 And Þnally, even in those cases where damages
are assessed, courts frequently face signiÞcant obstacles in verifying either the
plaintiﬀ’s loss or the defendant’s gain. As noted in the introduction, we are
somewhat dubious (if not critical) of the current state of aﬀairs. We present the
principal reasons for our misgivings below.

3

A Model of Mutual Investment in Goodwill

This section presents our central arguments more formally, analyzing the relationship between goodwill-enhancing investments and trade secret entitlements
through the lens of a one-period game theoretic model of contracting. Though
relatively simple, such a framework exposes many of our core intuitions and
facilitates demonstration of three of our principal arguments. First, we argue
(consistent with existing literature on team production) that when the value
of trade secrets truly depends on joint investments by employer and employee,
it is generally impossible for any contract and/or legal rule to implement the
optimal levels of investment. As such, the best a contract (or default legal rule)
can do is to implement a form of second best that is compatible with the parties’ incentives and courts’ administrative limitations. Operating within such
constraints, we show that an “optimal” trade secret law would (unlike existing
doctrine) take express account of the relative contributions of the employer and
employee in engendering consumer goodwill. We also demonstrate that in many
circumstances, an optimal doctrine would tend to favor fractional entitlements
or liability rules rather than the hard-and-fast property rules that trade secret
doctrine (inter alia) currently prefers. Such entitlement schemes purposely envision a form of imperfect deterrence, in which employees successfully appropriate
the Þrm’s trade secrets, at least in certain circumstances. Finally, we demonstrate a form of duality between fractional entitlements and liability rules, in
which either type of entitlement protection (along with hybrid combinations
thereof) is capable of implementing an optimal entitlement scheme.

3.1

Basic Framework

Consider a contractual environment consisting of two risk-neutral players: An
employee (“he”), denoted by A; and an employer (“she”), denoted by B. Each
player has a hand in operating a business venture (or “Þrm”), which operates in
59 By ‘fractional,’ we mean a type of property protection in which the underlying informational asset is explicitly shared among the parties. Examples might include geographic
market divisions, divisions in time, or even probabilistic divisions of who receives the ultimate
property right. See generally Ayres & Talley (1995).
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a monopolistically competitive market (described at greater length below), and
which lasts–at least for the purposes of this section–a single period. During
the pendency of this period, B employs A to conduct routine tasks of production,
but in addition A and B also have individual opportunities to take actions that
increase prospective consumer “goodwill.” Such enhancements are important
for the Þrm, because without them it must operate in a perfectly competitive
market, making zero economic proÞts. Thus, the prospect of nurturing goodwill
is what allows the Þrm (and thus, A and B collectively) to make a non-zero
payoﬀ, which we denote by v ≥ 0. For expositional simplicity, we shall treat v
as a direct proxy for the value of accumulated “goodwill.”60
To avoid unnecessary notation, we also suppress in what follows the precise
details of the market mechanism that generates v, though we conjecture it to be
somewhat generalizable (not unlike the very deÞnition of “goodwill”). Indeed,
v could emerge from any number of standard market contexts without aﬀecting
our ultimate conclusions. Examples include the following:
• Most simply, v might capture the net willingness to pay 61 of a single,
brand-loyal customer who purchases one unit of output. Under this interpretation, the consumer herself constitutes the relevant demand-side
market, and expenditures in goodwill are tantamount to investments that
enhance her willingness to pay. (Because this is the simplest case, the
ensuing analysis adopts a narrative that is most consistent with the singlecustomer account).
• Alternatively, v might represent the total size of a market consisting of
a continuum of brand-loyal consumers, each of whom exhibits a net willingness to pay of some Þxed inÞnitessimal value
R v dv, so that the market’s
aggregate net willingness to pay is equal to 0 dv = v. Viewed in this
sense, expenditures in “goodwill” are tantamount to investments that increase the number of loyal customers, rather than the net willingness to
pay of each one.
• Finally, one could view v as a measure of total rents available in a market
consisting of a continuum of consumers with diﬀerential loyalties. For
instance, one might suppose that the Þrm charges a single price and faces a
brand-speciÞc inverse demand curve given by p(q) = c+M ax{0, A(v)−q},
where c denotes the Þrm’s
√ (constant) marginal cost, q denotes the Þrm’s
output, and A(v) ≡ 2 v. The Þrm’s
√ proÞt maximizing output in such
an environment is given by q ∗ = v, and its total economic proÞts are
equal to v. Viewed in this sense, expenditures in goodwill are tantamount
60 Implicitly,

then, this use is isomorphic to an assumption that the Þrm captures the entire
value of the goodwill enhancements, if any, once they are realized. As noted, however, this
assumption is simply for exposition, and is easily relaxed without loss of generality, so long as
the parties are able to capture some fraction of the surplus created by investments in goodwill.
61 By “net” willingess to pay, we mean her total willigness to pay less the competitive market
price (or alternatively, less the Þrm’s constant marginal cost, c).
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to investments that increase both the number of loyal customers and the
net willingness to pay of each.62
Notwithstanding which motivating account one adopts, the prospect of increasing v is clearly a critical consideration from an eﬃciency perspective, which
we shall equate to the contractual objective of maximizing of the players’ expected joint payoﬀ.63 Thus, it is important to be clear about how exactly the
players might act to enhance goodwill. To this end, we assume in what follows
that the realized value of v depends (stochastically) on non-monetary investments of eﬀort by both the employee and employer, which we denote as a and
b, respectively. In particular, suppose that v is a realization of a random variable V, drawn from an exponential distribution with (inverse) hazard rate of
[θ · a + (1 − θ) · b], where θ ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous parameter (discussed in
greater length below).64
While we suspect that a number of alternative distributional assumptions
are possible without changing our results, the characteristics of the posited
distribution lend both tractability and consistency with our the principal intuitions about two-sided investments in goodwill. Indeed, within this framework,
greater investment by either player (or, both) enhances the likely realization
of the consumer’s net valuation. A few sample probability density functions
may help clarify this intuition. Figure 1 depicts two such functions (denoted
as f (v)) for diﬀerent eﬀort levels by the players. (In the Þgure, the value of
θ is Þxed at 12 ). The solid line represents a situation where a = b = 1, while
the dashed line represents the case where the parties have increased their investment to a = b = 3. As a and b increase, the density of V grows ßatter,
shedding probability mass from lower realizations, and adding mass to the right
tail. This feature is consistent with our intuition that as the parties’ respective
investments grow larger, the likely realization of v tends to grow as well.65
62 Similarly, if the Þrm were a perfect price disciminator against its loyal customer base, v
√
would still capture the total rents available in the market if A(v) = 2v.
63 Importantly, the aim of maximizing A’s and B’s joint welfare is not the only possible aim.
For instance, in the third motivating account of v described in the text above, society may also
care about the deadweight loss caused by the Þrm’s monopoly pricing decision – a concern
that is not reßected in A’s and B’s joint wealth. In most of what follows, however, we do not
dwell on such considerations, for three reasons: First, such concerns may well be the province
of antitrust law rather than trade secret law; second, the joint value maximizing contract is
an important consideration for anyone interested in third-party eﬀects; and Þnally, goodwillenhancing investments are not particularly susceptible to meaningful welfare analyses in terms
of consumer surplus. See, e.g. Tirole [1990], at 103.
64 For a random variable X distributed according to an exponential distribution, the density
−x
γ

−x

function is given by f (x) = e γ , and the associated c.d.f. is given by F (x) = 1 − e γ , where
γ > 0 represents the sole distributional parameter. The hazard rate for such a distribution is
f(x)
given by 1−F (x) = γ1 . Thus, for the distribution given in the text, the hazard rate is equal to
1
.
θa+(1−θ)b
65 The alert

reader will notice that our framework implicitly considers investments in a
2

E(V )
=0
and b to be neither technological complements nor substitutes. In other words ∂ ∂a∂b
for all a, b. Virtually all of our qualitative results persist, however, so long as both parties’
investments truly matter – i.e., the parties eﬀorts are less than perfect substitutes for one
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Figure 1
Note that the above framework allows for the players to have distinct skills
at enhancing goodwill. Indeed, the parameter θ captures the importance of the
employee’s investment (relative to that of the employer) in enhancing consumer
goodwill. When θ = 0, the employer is the only party whose investment aﬀects
V. Conversely, when θ = 1, only the employee’s investments matter. In the
analysis that follows, however, we concentrate on the most interesting case of
where θ takes on more moderate values, and thus both the employee’s and
employer’s investments are capable of enhancing consumer goodwill. For it is
here that our model truly becomes one of “team production,” and it is here that
we would be most likely to observe multi-person Þrms in practice.66 ¡Explicitly,
¢
then, we shall assume in what follows that there exists some θ ∈ 0, 12 such
that
θ´ ∈ [θ, 1 − θ] .67 At this point, it is helpful to take explicit note of the ratio
³
θ
1−θ , which represents the employee’s relative marginal skill at nurturing
goodwill. (This expression will reappear in much of our analysis below).
Because the expected realization of v is strictly increasing in eﬀort levels a
and b, both players would prefer – all else held constant – large expenditures
of eﬀort by both parties. Of course, all else never is held constant. In this
case, goodwill investments come at a cost to those who build it up. Explicitly,
the players’ respective costs of expending eﬀort are given by cA (a) = 12 a2 and
another.
66 Indeed, when θ = 0 the employer would do just as well to higher a low-skilled employee
for whom such goodwill enhancing investments are expensive. Conversely, when θ = 1, the
employee would do just as well (were he suﬃciently liquid) to purchase the business from the
employer.
67 The fact that the interval is symmetric around 1 is relatively innocuous and can easily be
2
relaxed at the cost of additional notation. Indeed, with some minor modiÞcations, it would
be possible (though not necessarily helpful) to apply the framework below for any subinterval
on [0, 1].
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cB (b) = 12 b2 . Recall that, because these costs are non-monetary, they must be
borne personally by the player expending them.68
Although the above framework adequately speciÞes the process by which
parties can create and capture goodwill as a single Þrm, we have said little thus
far about how the parties might divide that goodwill in the event that they
Þnd themselves in competition with one another. This is obviously an important consideration; for many a trade secret dispute involves situations where a
departing employee uses customer information (or an analogous informational
asset) to “compete” with his erstwhile employer once goodwill investments are
sunk. One would hardly expect such a move to go uncontested by the employer,
who is likely to attempt to retain its installed goodwill in spite of the employee’s
eﬀorts. In the face of the employer’s resistance, then, one would expect the employee’s maneuvering to prove successful only some of the time.69 To capture
this notion, we shall assume that should the employee attempt to appropriate
customer goodwill, he will be successful only with some exogenous probability
σ ∈ [0, 1].
In addition, the aforementioned competition between the former employee
and employer may frequently motivate them to oﬀer enticements to lure or retain
their customer base (as the case may be) – actions which ultimately dissipate
the total rents available. Adding to this is the possibility that competition
between A and B may induce them inadvertently to divulge the content of the
trade secret to third parties who pose competitive threats. To reßect these
dissipative considerations, we suppose that the ultimate winner of the contest
between A and B captures only some (exogenous) fraction κ ∈ [0, 1] of the
available surplus, and thus competition reduces the joint rents available to the
parties from v to κ · v.
Like v, the parameters κ and σ are relatively general, and admit at least two
non-exclusive interpretations:
• From a market structure perspective, κ can be seen as reßecting the severity of market competition between A and B (along with any other potential
competitors). “Cut-throat” (e.g., Bertrand) competition corresponds to a
value of κ = 0, where subsequent competition dissipates all the available
rents. Conversely, κ = 1 reßects an extremely non-competitive environment, in which neither A nor B needs to oﬀer price concessions to the
customer. Intermediate values of κ reßect moderate degrees of competition (e.g., Cournot or Stackelberg). Similarly, under this interpretation,
σ and (1 − σ) capture A’s and B’s resulting market shares of a resulting
duopoly, and hence proxy for considerations such as Þrst-mover advantages or preferences of the consumer(s) now having to choose between two
68 The

quadratic form of the cost functions is actually more restrictive than necessary. All of
our results will continue to hold for any cost functions ci (x), i = {A, B} that are continuous,
twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and convex for all x > 0, so long as c0i (0) < θ0 .
69 See, e.g., Bancroft-Whitney v. Glen [cite], where the departing employees were able to
siphon oﬀ a fraction of the business from the erstwhile employer’s customer list, but not all.
For those who favor pop culture to case law, see Jerry MacGuire, Act
Scene
(TriStar
Pictures, 1996).
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(otherwise competitive) goods.70
• From a Coasean perspective, κ captures a measure of the transaction costs
(and/or commitment problems) that impede ex post collusion between
the parties. Particularly when post-employment competition is severe (see
above), there is a strong incentive for A and B to bargain with one another,
in order both to divide the market and to keep the contents of the trade
secret conÞdential. Thus, κ = 1 might represent a zero-transaction-costs
world, in which–regardless of the default form of competition–A and B
are always able to collude and thus avoid leaving money on the table.71
Lower values of κ are consistent with the presence of positive transaction
costs that tend to impede such collusion. Viewed from this perspective,
then, σ would capture A’s ex post bargaining power against B in deciding
who how to divide the market. Values of σ close to 1 are consistent with
signiÞcant employee bargaining power, and vice versa when σ is close to
0.
Before proceeding, it is convenient at this juncture to deÞne a few terms frequently associated with our methodology and to state an assumption pertaining
thereto. First, in the analysis that follows, we shall take care to check that the
parties’ investment and post-investment strategies constitute a Bayesian-perfect
equilibrium. In other words, we shall require that at each juncture of the game,
each of the parties acts in a way that is a strategic best response to the posited
strategy of the other party. When, under a given contract, such a condition
holds true for both parties, their posited actions are said to be incentive compatible.
Second, we shall also take care to be sure that given their expectations about
later equilibrium play, each of the players has an incentive to participate in the
contract to begin with. Equivalently, we shall always require that each of the
players must expect to receive at least her opportunity cost in exchange for
participation. For the employer, this means receiving an expected payoﬀ that
exceeds her Þxed costs associated with running the business, denoted by F ≥ 0.
For the employee, it means receiving an expected payoﬀ at least as large as the
wage that he could presumably earn from an outside entity, denoted by w ≥ 0.
When both of these conditions are met under a candidate contract, the contract
is said to be individually rational.
The analysis which follows becomes signiÞcantly less tedious if we assume
that a condition related to – but weaker than – individual rationality is always
satisÞed. In particular, we shall assume throughout what follows that the minimal attainable operating proÞts at the Þrm are not “too” low. Mathematically,
this assumption is as follows:
Assumption 1: F + w ≤

1
2

· θ2 .

70 For the sake of generality, we allow σ to be independent of the investment parameter θ,
though one could certainly imagine situations where the customer is more likely to go with
the entity who was most successful at enhancing her goodwill.
71 That is, transferring rents to consumers.
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Assumption 1 essentially requires that there are always positive net gains
from organizing and operating the Þrm. It is a necessary (but not suﬃcient)
condition for individual rationality. The left hand side of the inequality represents A’s and B’s aggregate opportunity costs from working at the Þrm. The
right hand side of the inequality represents the gross payoﬀ that the Þrm would
be able to generate under the stewardship of the most inept type of employer
(i.e., θ = θ) who enjoys an undivided property right in the value of goodwill.72
Finally, and nontrivially, the analysis that follows assumes that employee’s
total wealth is constrained at some level Y < ∞, so that the most draconian
payoﬀ that could ever be visited upon him is equal to −Y . This limited ability to
post a performance bond is potentially an important consideration, particularly
for contracts under which the employee would receive most of the available
downstream rents. For deÞnitional purposes, we shall say in what follows that
a given contractual allocation is implementable if it is incentive compatible,
individually rational and also satisÞes A’s wealth constraint.73

3.2

First Best

For purposes of comparison, we Þrst ask what levels of investment maximize
the sum of the player’s expected payoﬀ (i.e., joint welfare), net of their respective opportunity costs. As we shall soon discover, informational constraints
may render such an outcome it unattainable. Nevertheless, establishing a Þrst
best measure of investment will prove a useful benchmark for the sake of later
comparisons.
Note Þrst that whenever κ < 1, it is never part of a Þrst-best allocation
for the employee to compete with the employer. Indeed, if he did so, it would
reduce the total available surplus to κ · v < v, thereby squandering a (1 − κ)
fraction of the available surplus. Thus, unless κ = 1, a Þrst best allocation will
always suppress potential competition between A and B.74
Assuming, then, that none of the allocational surplus is squandered, the
Þrst-best investment levels are given by solving the following problem:
·
¸
a2 b2
−
Max E(V |a, b) −
(1)
a,b
2
2
Noting that E(V |a, b) = θ · a + (1 − θ) · b, this yields Þrst best eﬀort levels:
af b = θ;

bf b = (1 − θ)

72 Relaxing Assumption 1 is eminently possible, once again at the cost of additional notation.
However, if anything, doing so probably strengthens our argument that pro-employer property
rights are frequently inferior to other entitlement regimes. Indeed, assuming that both F
and w are necessary Þxed costs of production, violation of Assumption 1 would imply that an
incentive compatible, individually rational contract under a pro-employer property entitlement
is simply unattainable.
73 Following convention (and intuition), we shall assume throughout that the employer does
not face a wealth constraint that binds in any payoﬀ-relevant circumstances.
74 When κ = 1, obviously, such competition is irrelevant to allocational eﬃciency.
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i
h 2
2
.
which in turn give rise to a maximized social welfare value75 of θ +(1−θ)
2
Quite clearly, it would be most desirable to write a contract mandating that
the respective parties invest af b and bf b . However, enforcing such a contract
would require a number of preconditions that (in our minds) are not generally
present. Indeed, such a contract would require that the parties could observe
(and provide probative evidence about) one another’s conduct, so as to deter
deviations from the prescribed behavior. In many business contexts – and in
particular those studied here, where the player’s “eﬀorts” take place in rather
disparate arenas – both observability and veriÞability are likely impossible.
In such situations, even when the customer’s realized valuation is commonlyknown, this Þrst-best level of investment is not attainable. This reasoning is
embodied in the following proposition, whose proof is well-known in the literature76 :
Proposition 1: If a and b are not observable and veriÞable, there does not exist
an implementable contract that achieves a Þrst best level of investment.
This result is fairly easy to see. No matter how the various investments
of the parties are split, they still must be split. And thus, on the margin at
least one party must bear all the marginal costs of her investment, but will
see only a fraction of the marginal gains. The obvious consequence is endemic
underinvestment.
Absent contracting directly on a and b, then, the players might attempt to
write a contract based on the realized value of v. Such a contract would give
each of the parties some share in the realized surplus. It turns out that even
here, absent involvement of a third party, even these forms of contracts are
generally not able to achieve Þrst-best eﬃciency, but may be able to accomplish
some measure of second best.77
In the analysis that follows, however, we posit that the parties must operate in an even more constrained judicial environment yet. Indeed, as was
noted in the introduction, one of the reasons that courts have favored propertylike entitlements is that they face signiÞcant obstacles in measuring damages.
As such, even when the realization of v is observable to both parties, often a
court will not have the resources to verify their observations. In order to be
sensitive to this possibility, we shall purposely assume in what follows that an
optimal contract (and thus legal doctrine) can turn on neither the investments
of the parties nor the realized value of the goodwill created. Rather, we shall
assume that courts’ veriÞcation powers are limited to discerning (i) whether
the employee is still working with the Þrm, and (ii) if he is not, whether he is
attempting to appropriate the installed goodwill in order to compete with his
erstwhile employer.78
75 Note, of course, this is a measure of gross social welfare. The “true” economic surplus can
be obtained by subtracting the parties’ opportunity costs, w and F. If Assumption 1 holds,
this diﬀerence will always be strictly positive.
76 See, e.g., Holmstrom (1982); Grossman & Hart (1986).
77 See, e.g., Schwartz & Watson (2000); Che & Rauch (1999).
78 There is another, more basic motivation behind our assumption that v is not veriÞable in
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3.3

Incentive Eﬃcient Allocations

Given that Þrst-best is probably not attainable, our inquiry now asks what
is the best one can do in a second-best (“or incentive eﬃcient”) world. As
noted in the introduction, our analysis will (for the most part) equate optimal
contracting with an optimal legal rule — that is, the most eﬃcient legal rule would
provide all the incentivizing aspects of the contract, and by so doing facilitate
the execution of a very simple (ßat wage) express contract. In the subsections
that follows, we will compare three distinct types of legal entitlements from an
optimal contracting perspective: Property Rules, Fractional Entitlements, and
Liability Rules. As noted above, we shall suppose throughout that the realized
value of goodwill, v, is observable but not veriÞable in court.
3.3.1

Property Rules

Consider Þrst the choice among two “undivided” property rules: One favoring
the employer (and thus prohibiting all attempted appropriations) and the other
favoring the employee (and thus allowing unfettered competition between the
employer and employee should the latter leave the Þrm). To be sure, this is
perhaps the most resource-constrained environment a judge may Þnd herself in.
All she can do is to choose who gets the entitlement, and then protect it with
the threat of injunctive relief (or stiﬀ, in terrorem penalties). Nevertheless, this
is an important case to consider: as noted in the introduction, courts generally
utilize property rules rather than liability rules to protect trade secrets, and
thus most of the doctrinal puzzles revolve around who receives the assignment
(rather than how her entitlement is protected).
Let q ∈ {0, 1} denote a policy variable distinguishing between a pro-employer
property assignment (q = 0) on the one hand, and a pro-employee entitlement
– that is, an entitlement to compete freely – (q = 1) on the other. Under a
pro-employer property entitlement, only the employer receives any of the rents
from development of goodwill. The employee, meanwhile, earns only his wage
less the costs of his eﬀorts. Under a pro-employee “property” rule, in contrast,
the employer is not necessarily disabled form appropriating goodwill; rather,
such a rule merely permits the employee an unfettered right to compete on even
ground with the employer for the existing goodwill. Within such a regime, then,
the employer may still wish to invest ex ante, knowing that she will be able to
appropriate the fruits of that investment at least some of the time.
court: If it were, it would be unlikely to observe either the contractual environment we posit,
or many trade secret disputes. Indeed, observability of v permits the consideration of a range
of contracts involving third-parties – contracts that can attain Þrst-best levels of investment.
To see this point more clearly, suppose that A and B entered the
h followingi‘swap’ contract
2

2

, but in return
with a third party, C : C receives an up-front payment of v ∗ = θ +(1−θ)
2
she promises to pay the Þrm an amount equal to the realization of v, doubling the Þrm’s gross
income to 2v, which is then split by the players. So long the up-front payment does not violate
A’s wealth constraint, it always gives rise to Þrst-best investment and no defections by the
employee, even in the absence of trade secret protection.

25

Given the various parameters of the model explained above, one can derive
the player’s respective ex ante payoﬀs as a function of q as follows:
π A (a, b) = w + (q · σ · κ) · E (V |a, b) −

a2
2

(2)

b2
(3)
2
The optimal contracting problem amounts to choosing eﬀort levels a and b,
a wage w, and a property entitlement q ∈ {0, 1} so as to maximize expected
surplus, subject incentive constraints, participation constraints, and A’s wealth
constraint. More formally, the problem is as follows:
π B (a, b) = −w + [(1 − q) + (1 − σ) qκ] · E (V |a, b) −

M ax

a,b,w, q∈{0,1}

π A (a, b) + πB (a, b), subject to :
(i) a ∈ arg max πA (a, b)
(ii) b ∈ arg max πB (a, b)
(iii) πA (a, b) ≥ w
(iv) π B (a, b) ≥ F
(v) w ≥ −Y

In the above problem, constraints (i) and (ii) represent incentive constraints,
which (recall) require the player’s investments must constitute an equilibrium.
Constraints (iii) and (iv) represent participation constraints, requiring that each
player expect at least her reservation payoﬀ from participating in the contract.
And constraint (v) represents the employee’s wealth constraint. Analysis of
this problem yields the following proposition (whose proof can be found in the
appendix):
Proposition 2: Consider the binary choice among entitlements q ∈ {0, 1}.
The optimal entitlement, q ∗ , is given by:
½
θ
b and Y ≥ Yb
1 if 1−θ
≥N
,
q∗ =
0 else
b≡
where N

³

σ 2 +κ−2 −1
σ·(2−σ)

´ 12

³
and Yb ≡ F −κ2 (1 − σ) σθ 2 +

(1−σ)
2

´
(1 − θ)2 .

Proposition 2 articulates necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a court to
grant the employe an entitlement to compete (or equivalently, deny trade secret protection to an employer). Such an outcome is optimal if and only if (i)
the employee’s skill at engendering goodwill (relative to the employer’s) is sufÞciently high; and (ii) his wealth constraint is not binding. If either of these
conditions fails, a property right in the trade secret favoring the employer is
optimal. Clearly, then, a few words about both conditions are in order, and we
discuss them in turn.
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θ
b This condition states that the optimal entitlement depends
≥ N.
(i) 1−θ
on an assessment of the relative advantage that the employee has over the employer in enhancing consumer goodwill. Note that so long as κ and σ are
b is bounded away from both 0 and ∞. Moreover, whether N
b exceeds
positive, N
or is less than one is indeterminate, and will depend on the values of the deep
b , it is always the
parameters of the model.79 Thus, for any Þxed value of N
case that an employee with suﬃciently large skills at enhancing goodwill should
receive the entitlement. From a doctrinal perspective, the fact that the optimal
property rule turns on relative advantage is signiÞcant: As noted in the last
section, many courts tend to stop at the conclusion that employer investments
played any role in enhancing goodwill, upon which they assign the right to the
employer.
This result is consistent with that of Aghion & Tirole (1994), but it adds to
it in two respects. First, Aghion and Tirole study the binary choice between (i)
assigning an exclusive property right to the employer, versus (ii) assigning the
exclusive right to the employee. Importantly, this is rarely the comparison that
one observes in practice, where judges must choose between assigning ownership
to the employer or assigning it to no one. Our analysis, in contrast, tracks the
more conventional legal decision: An assignment of q = 1 simply allows both
the employer and employee to compete freely for the installed goodwill. Second,
and relatedly, the parameters that aﬀect the parties’ payoﬀs from that competition matter. As is clear from the proposition, the values of κ and σ are critical
b is strictly
b .80 On inspection it is clear that N
in determining the benchmark N
decreasing in κ, signifying that when competition between A and B grows increasingly destructive of their joint rents, an optimal doctrine will accordingly
demand a larger comparative advantage of the employee before awarding her
the entitlement. This tendency is consistent with one’s intuitions.
b and the employee’s ability
On the other hand, the relationship between N
to lure customers from the employer, σ, is not a monotone one. Nonetheless,
one can still make a few generalizations. When competition between A and B
b is increasing in σ,
is not destructive (κ is near one), the threshold value of N
and thus A’s eﬀectiveness at siphoning oﬀ business (and/or bargaining power)
actually works against her.81 The intuition behind this observation stems from
recognizing one that one of the principal values of non-protection (at least when
when σ < 1) is that it still induces both parties to invest: Indeed, even the
employer thinks there is a chance she can retain her customer base in the face
of the employee’s competitive challenge. When σ grows large, the employer loses
this incentive; and thus the threshold at which the employee’s relative advantage
justiÞes awarding her the property right grows accordingly. Conversely, when
competition between A and B is highly destructive (κ is near zero), the threshold
b decreases in σ, thereby imposing a lesser burden on A to demonstrate his
N

q
b ≥ 1 no matter what the value of σ.
can be shown, however, that κ ≤ 23 , then N
80 Note that the special case of κ = σ = 1 is equivalent to the Aghion/Tirole framework,
where q = 1 implies that the employee always receives an undivided entitlement.
b
81 In particular, the sign of ∂ N
has the same sign as does κ2 (σ + 1 − σ) − (1 − σ).
∂σ
79 It
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relative advantage. Here the intuition less direct, but similar: When σ is small,
the employee is not conÞdent ex ante of his abilities to appropriate any customer
goodwill, and he is made even more pessimistic by the fact that κ is small, and
thus even attempting to appropriate will dissipate a number of the available
rents. Since the Þrst few dollars of the employee’s investment come cheaply, it
b thereby giving at least some employees an
becomes optimal to ease back on N
incentive to invest notwithstanding prospective joint losses due to competition.
(ii) Y ≥ Yb . The second condition stated by Proposition 2 is that in some
situations, a pro-employee entitlement may entail requiring that he be suﬃciently liquid to compensate B ex ante for her expected shortfalls. In essence,
this condition states that if, under a pro-employee assignment, B’s expected
variable proÞts82 fail to cover her Þxed costs, then A would have agree to a negative wage suﬃciently large to make up the diﬀerence. If he is severely wealth
constrained, he may not be able to aﬀord such a transfer payment, even if he
agreed to pay his entire disposable wealth, Y. In such a situation, a property
entitlement favoring A is not feasible.
A few things bear noting about the condition on Y . First, note that it is only
one of two conditions at play. Many principal-agent models hinge critically on
the agent’s wealth constraint. That is, all ineﬃciencies could be removed by simply selling the business to the employee, or having him post a suﬃciently large
performance bond. In the case of two-sided investment, however, wealth constraints are merely one consideration (which need not bind). Second, note the
constraint on the employee’s available wealth becomes sharper as κ decreases,
and as θ and σ increase. This is consistent with one’s intuition. As competition becomes more destructive of available rents (κ shrinks) or as the employee
becomes a more eﬀective competitor (σ grows), B has a reduced chance of recouping her Þxed costs through competition, and will require a larger up-front
concession from A.
On the other hand, as these two parameters move in the opposite direction,
the wealth constraint on the employee may become so slack as to require no
up-front bonding by the employee. In addition, note that if the employee’s
wealth is at least as large as the employer’s Þxed costs, then condition (ii)
will always be satisÞed. While it may be unrealistic to think in the ordinary
course that an employee has such resources, one has to remember that in the
context of trade secrets, one is often dealing with highly-skilled (and thus highlyremunerated) employees. In many circumstances the employee will have such
resources available.
Be that as it may, the take-away message from this subsection can be summarized as follows. If courts must choose among undivided property entitlements,
then an optimal legal entitlement will not generally turn (as does current doctrine) on a simple assessment of whether employer investments in enhancing
goodwill are/have been important, or merely whether a valuable trade secret
exists. Instead, courts should take into consideration relative abilities of the
82 That

is, (1 − σ) · κ · E(v) −

(b∗ )2
2

.
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employee and employer to make such investments. Moreover, there is no a priori reason to favor employers in making this assessment. Indeed, the employee
may be the most eﬃcient ex ante entitlement holder when:83
• The employee enjoys a comparative advantage in building up goodwill
θ
is large);
(i.e., 1−θ
• Post-termination competition between employer and employee is not too
destructive and/or inter se transaction costs are small (i.e., κ is large);
• The employer either is partially eﬀective at retaining existing customers in
the face of competition with the employee and/or she has a large amount
of ex post bargaining power (i.e., σ is small); and
• The wealth constraints on the employee are not severe (i.e., Y is large).
3.3.2

Fractional Entitlements

The analysis thus far has concentrated solely on a binary choice among undivided property rules. As noted in the previous sections, this choice appears
to be what most courts tend to focus on. However, suppose that instead of
declaring ex ante whether the employer gets the entitlement, a court (credibly)
commits to a mechanism that assigns to each of the parties a fractional claim
over the entitlement, through either a randomization process, or (if feasible) an
explicit division of the market (such as granting trade secret protection to but a
strict subset of existing customers). In this subsection, we brießy address such
possibilities explicitly. While we Þnd them to be a promising alternative, they
may not ultimately be universally practical in a system that tends to evolve
towards clear, ex ante rules, and away from ex-post standards. Nevertheless,
such partial entitlement schemes still deserve our attention, at least some of the
time.
Before commencing, we should take care to point out that certain types of
partial entitlements will simply not be feasible if (as we have maintained) v is
not veriÞable in court. Thus, a court seeking to award a partial entitlement will
not be directly able to divide the monetary income stream among the parties.
However, it may be able to do so using indirect means. Suppose, for example,
that a court did not determine an entitlement until after investments are made,
upon which one of the parties petitions it to make a property rights assignment. (Such situations may be more plausible than one would ordinarily think,
often taking the form of declaratory judgment actions by either the employee
or employer against her counterpart). Moreover, suppose that when it is so
called upon to act, the court randomizes its decision, awarding the employee
the entitlement to compete with probability q, and the employer with probability (1 − q). Once the court makes its decision, A may attempt to appropriate
should it receive the assignment.
83 It should be emphasized that this list is neither conjunctive nor alternative, but rather
a collection of important factors. For instance, a strong case pro-employee advantage in
productivity relaxes the requirement that κ must be relatively large.
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Note that q = 1 simply corresponds to a rule that always assigns the entitlement to the employee with certainty, and vice versa for q = 0. These two
extreme cases were studied in the earlier section. For intermediate values of
q, the parties’ respective payoﬀs (πA (a, b) and πB (a, b)) are identical to those
deÞned in equations (2) and (3) from the previous subsection.
In a world of fractional entitlements, the employee’s wealth constraint becomes somewhat more complex than in the previous subsection. In order to
deal with this complexity, it is convenient to state the following lemma:84
Lemma A: A fractional entitlement q is implementable only if the employee’s
wealth, Y , is at least Y (q), where:
Y (q) ≡ F −qσκ ((1 − q) + q (1 − σ) κ)·θ2 +

((1 − q) + q (1 − σ) κ)2
(1 − θ)2 .
2

The condition in the above lemma is simply a generalization of the wealth
constraint condition from Proposition 2,85 modiÞed to reßect the diﬀerential effects that changes in q impose on the employee’s wealth constraint. Intuitively,
as q increases from 0, the employer’s equilibrium revenue (i.e., her expected payoﬀ gross of wages, Þxed costs and direct eﬀort costs) strictly decreases, as the
employee receives a stronger fractional right to siphon oﬀ business. This steady
decline will eventually put a signiÞcant strain on the employer’s incentives to
participate, which, recall, require that she earn net proÞts large enough to satisfy at least her Þxed costs F. However, as the employer’s equilibrium payoﬀ
decreases, the employee’s increases, which makes her more likely to accept a
low wage, and perhaps even a negative wage (in, say, the form of a performance
bond). But in no event can such a bond exceed A’s disposable wealth, Y. Accordingly, the condition in the lemma comes from asking whether the employer
would still be willing to participate in the event that such a bond were maximal
– that is, set equal to the employee’s disposable wealth. As the condition states,
the employer willingness to participate would depend on q, – and in particular
she would participate only if A could post a bond of at least Y (q).86
Beyond these caveats, the optimal contracting problem is virtually identical
to that of the previous subsection, and consists of choosing eﬀort levels a and b,
a wage w, and a property entitlement chosen from the interval q ∈ [0, 1] to maximize expected surplus subject incentive, participation, and wealth constraints:
M ax

a,b,w; q∈[0,1]

84 The

πA (a, b) + π B (a, b), subject to :
(i) a ∈ arg max πA (a, b)
(ii) b ∈ arg max πB (a, b)
(iii) πA (a, b) ≥ w
(iv) πB (a, b) ≥ F
(v) w ≥ −Y

proof of this lemma is omitted.
is, the condition Y ≥ Yb . To see this, simply note that Y (1) = Yb as given in the
Proposition.
86 The reader should note that for high enough values of q, Y (q) is negative, and thus it
does not represent an important constraint. Indeed, Y (q) is never binding if Y > Y (1) = Yb .
85 That
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Analysis of this problem yields Proposition 3 (whose proof can be found in the
appendix):
Proposition 3: Consider the choice among fractional entitlements q ∈ [0, 1].
The optimal entitlement, q ∗ , is given by:
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and

qbκσ is the unique root on [0, 1] of the equation Y = Y (q).

In spite of its tedious notation, Proposition 3 is actually relatively simple.
It states two principal arguments worth emphasizing. First, it suggests that
when one opens up consideration to include fractional entitlements, the optimal
entitlement scheme still boils down to comparing the parties’ relative skills at enhancing consumer goodwill. When the comparative advantage sits one-sidedly
with the employer, the optimal rule tends toward a pro-employer property rule,
and vice versa when such an advantage resides with the employee. So far, this
is very much like the bottom line message from Proposition 2. But Proposition
3 also states that a fractional entitlement scheme may frequently be preferable
to either type of undivided property rule. The table below summarizes this
observations. The columns of the table designate three relevant regions into
which the employee’s relative goodwill-enhancing skills might fall: Region 1
designates situations where the employer has a relatively one-sided relative advantage. Region 3 designates situations where the one-sided advantage sits with
the employee; and Region 2 designates situations where the parties’ skills are
commensurable (relative to other parameters in the model). Note that within
Region 2, fractional entitlements tend to be optimal.

Y (q) not binding
Y (q) binding

Region 1
θ
1−θ < N0
Prop. Rule: B
N/A87

Region 2
θ
≤ N1
N0 ≤ 1−θ
Fractional
Fractional

Region 3
θ
1−θ > N1
Prop. Rule: A
Fractional

Table 1
87 So long as Assumption 1 holds, the agent’s wealth constraint will never bind with a
pro-principal property rule.
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Another interesting feature reßected in the table (and in Proposition 3)
concerns the relationship between the optimal entitlement and the employee’s
wealth constraint. This can be seen most clearly by considering the rows of the
table, which reßect whether the constraint on the employee’s wealth (Y ≤ Y (q))
is binding on the contracting problem. Note from the table that, unlike with
pure property rules (where signiÞcant wealth constraints always imply a proemployer assignment), here a binding wealth constraint means at most (i) that
an optimal entitlement assignment would not award A (i.e., the employee) an
absolute right to compete, or (ii) that it should lean slightly more in the direction
of the employer that it otherwise would absent such a constraint. However, in
no instance does A’s liquidity constraint alone imply that the employer should
receive an absolute entitlement to accumulated goodwill.88 This is a signiÞcant
result, given the frequency with which legal scholars and economists have defended pro-employer property rights on the basis of an employee’s inability to
bond.89
Consistent with the previous section, there is no a priori reason to think that
“most” employment arrangements will fall in the Northwest cell of the above
table. Indeed, contractual environments that are likely to fall outside Region 1
include those in which:
• The employee possesses even moderate skills at building up goodwill (i.e.,
θ
1−θ is not too small);
• Post-termination competition between employer and employee is not too
destructive and/or inter se transaction costs are small (i.e., κ is large);
and
• The employer either is partially eﬀective at retaining existing customers in
the face of competition with the employee and/or she has a large amount
of ex post bargaining power (i.e., σ is relatively small).
In spite of the advantages that fractional entitlements frequently enjoy over
hard-and-fast property rules, we are not naṏve about the potential practical
problems in implementing such schemes. Although the current state of trade
secret law may be notably unpredictable,90 it is the very nature of the legal
system to strive for clarity and certainty. Over time, standards and casuistry
often give way (for better or for worse) to rules and rights.91 The law of trade
88 One caveat should be noted here: In situations where the employer has all of the ex ante
bargaining power, the employee’s wealth constraint, if suﬃciently sharp (at, say, Y = 0) can
imply the optimality of a pro-employer property right. See, e.g., Talley (1998). However, this
concern is of little moment if either of these conditions is relaxed (even moderately). We suspect that such situations are probably more common in environments of highly skilled workers,
whose unique skills give them both additional bargaining power and additional accumulated
capital that slackens their wealth constraint.
89 Cites.
90 Hyde (2000), for instance, notes while the deÞnition of ‘trade secret’ is broad enough to
include almost any informational asset (and some non-informational ones), most cases actually
turn on opaque, moralist camparisons that are subject to chronic indeterminacy.
91 Cite Rose; Kaplow.
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secrets may be no diﬀerent in this regard. As such, there is no guarantee that
the sort of sustained institutional “randomness” that would be necessary to
implement a probabilistic entitlement protection will be long lived.92
In the absence of such probabilistic mechanisms, a court would have to Þnd
other ways to implement a fractional entitlement. One possibility would be for
courts to attempt explicit divisions of the relevant market, say by enjoining
the employee from competing for some given fraction of the Þrm’s customers,
or by distorting the competitive environment by limiting the content of the
communications that departing employees may transmit to prospective clients.
Some of these alternative schemes may be eﬀective for some Þrms (and indeed
have been implemented by some courts93 ); but for other businesses – such
as those with a small number of core, revenue-generating clients – it may be
genuinely impossible (in the absence of probabilistic approaches) to implement
these sorts of Solomonic divisions.
Nevertheless, we believe that the arguments made here are still important,
for at least two reasons. First, although trade secret doctrine may eventually
evolve to a perfectly predictable, rule-based doctrine, it still has a long road to
travel. In its current state, trade secret law is still riddled with unpredictabilities
that put the ultimate outcome of many a dispute in doubt. Rather than decrying this characteristic as a weakness and advocating hastened reform,94 our
analysis counsels a somewhat more measured response – one that highlights
the hidden strategic beneÞts of preserving unpredictability as long as is practicable (at least in situations involving genuine two-sided investment). Second,
our analysis suggests that courts should at least ponder the feasibility of trade
secret doctrines that explicitly divide markets. Indeed, if an express division of
markets can be accomplished, in many instances that would be preferable to a
monolithic award of all the available rents to a single party.
In fact, as the next section suggests, there may be more than one way to
skin a cat. For even when expressly fractional entitlements are impractical, it
may well be possible to use liability rules to accomplish a similar result. It is
to this consideration that we now turn.
3.3.3

Liability Rules

We have heretofore explicitly limited our attention to property entitlements,
either undivided or fractional. But we haven’t said anything about another
form of divided entitlement, liability rules. This subsection addresses this omis92 A possible exception here is the closely-related “corporate opportunities doctrine,” which
seems to suﬀer from chronic unpredicatbility. See Talley (1998); Brudney & Clark (1981).
93 Cites.
94 See, e.g., Note, The Impending Merger of the Invevitable Disclosure Doctrine and Negative
Trade Secrets: Is Trade Secrets Law Headed in the Right Direction?, 25 J. Corp. L. 383, 396
(2000); Uniform State Laws Comm., Or. State Bar, Brief History of UTSA in Oregon at P 1
(submitted as a portion of exhibit 6 to Public Hearing on SB 298 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 64th Leg. Assembly (Or. Apr. 1, 1987)), at P B. (concluding that then-existing
Oregon trade secrets law was unpredictable in several respects and that properly drafted
legislation could make the law more predictable and reconcile apparent conßicts in the law.
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sion, and argues that liability rules may be an adequate substitute for express
fractional entitlements.
Like before, we shall consider contracts containing a ßat wage component,
denoted by w. But unlike before, we shall assume throughout that a hard-andfast entitlement is awarded to the employer. Instead, it is the form of protection
that we shall vary. In particular, we assume below that in the event that the
employee attempts to appropriate the Þrm’s goodwill, he would not be impeded
from so doing as long as he were willing to pay D ≥ 0 dollars to the employer in
the form of damages. (Consistent with our assumption that v is not veriÞable,
the damages term D cannot depend on either the actual investments of the
parties or the realized value of goodwill95 ).
Note that such a framework allows us to analyze a complete range of entitlement protections that a court might utilize, including (as luck would have it) the
two undivided property rule options analyzed in the previous section. Indeed,
D = 0 corresponds to a legal rule that awards the employee an unfettered right
to appropriate the customer–that is, a property entitlement for the employee
to compete freely. Conversely, D = ∞ corresponds to a legal rule that imposes
heavily punitive damages on the employee, eﬀectively deterring her from ever
appropriating the customer. Finally, D ∈ (0, ∞) represents a continuum of
pro-employer entitlements protected by a liability rule with damages D.96
Unlike the probabilistic property rules addressed above, liability rules endow
each of A and B with a diﬀerent form of fractional entitlement: long and short
positions (respectively) in a “call option,” where the underlying asset is the
right to compete with the Þrm for its customer base, and where the strike price
is equal to D. Thus, the respective structural payoﬀs of the parties here become
slightly more involved than before, and we take each of them up in turn.
Consider Þrst the employee’s decision. Once the value of v is realized, she
must choose whether to stay at the Þrm or to leave and compete with A. She
will leave if and only if expected rents available (σκv) are suﬃciently high to
justify paying damages (D).97 Viewed at the point of realization of v, then, B’s
expected payoﬀ (ignoring any sunk costs) is given by:
w + max {σκv − D, 0}

(4)

As viewed from the time of investment, then, A’s expected payoﬀ consists of
the expectation of this revenue stream less his private costs of eﬀort. Accordingly, the employee’s ex ante expected payoﬀ π A (a, b) is given by:
π A (a, b) = w + (σκ) · e−ρ(a,b) · (θa + (1 − θ)b) −
95 A

a2
,
2

(5)

later section (not yet written) will consider what is possible when v is veriÞable.
that our analysis allows as well for D = w, so that the agent may appropriate the
customer, but only if she is willing to forego receiving any wages from the Þrm.
97 Note from this condition that we implicitly assume that the agent pays D as soon as she
chooses to go into competition with the employer, regardless of who actually prevails in such
a competition. Our results change little if one assumes that damages are paid only in the
event of a successful challenge.
96 Note
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−1

D·(σκ)
where ρ (a, b) = (θa+(1−θ)b)
.
Now consider the employer’s problem. From the employee’s payoﬀ in (5), it
is relatively straightforward to derive B’s expected payoﬀ, π B (a, b). Indeed, B
can be thought of as having an entitlement to v, but less (i) the wage obligation
to A; (ii) the call option (described above) held by A; and (iii) the employer’s
cost of eﬀort. Consequently, the employer’s payoﬀ is given by:

h
i
b2
πB (a, b) = 1 − (1 − κ + σκ) · e−ρ(a,b) (θa + (1 − θ)b) − w −
2

(6)

Using these payoﬀs, it is possible to gain purchase on what is implied by incentive compatibility. The lemma below (whose proof appears in the appendix)
characterizes the equilibrium choices of the players given D.
Lemma B: Investment choices of eﬀort a∗ and b∗ are incentive compatible under a given liability rule D ∈ [0, ∞) if and only if the following conditions
are satisÞed:
∗

∗

a∗ = θ · (σκ) · (1 + ρ (a∗ , b∗ )) · e−ρ(a ,b )
h
i
∗ ∗
b∗ = (1 − θ) · 1 − (1 − κ + σκ) · e−ρ(a ,b ) · (1 + ρ (a∗ , b∗ )) .

(ICA )
(ICB )

The interpretation of (ICA ) and (ICB ) is conventional and intuitive. They
both state that the marginal costs of investments in goodwill (a∗ and b∗ , respectively) must each be equal to the respective marginal expected beneÞts,
represented by the right hand side of the above expressions. Incorporating
Lemma B into the optimal contracting problem produces the following:
M ax

a,b,w,D≥0

πA (a, b) + πB (a, b), subject to :
(i) a satisÞes (ICA )
(ii) b satisÞes (ICB )
(iii) π A (a, b) ≥ w
(iv) πB (a, b) ≥ F
(v) w ≥ −Y

Analysis of this problem leads to Proposition 4 (whose proof appears in the
appendix):
Proposition 4: Consider the choice among liability rule entitlements D ∈
[0, ∞), and the associated equilibrium investment strategies a∗ and b∗ deÞned by (ICA ) and (ICB ) in Lemma B. The optimal level of damages,
D∗ , is characterized by:

θ
∞
if 1−θ
< N0


 0
θ
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1−θ > N1 and Y ≥ Y (1)
D∗ =
,
θ
D
∈ [N0 , N1 ] and Y ≥ Y (qD )
if 1−θ


 κσ
b κσ else
D
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∗

∗

where qD = e−ρ(a ,b ) · (1 + ρ (a∗ , b∗ )) ; Dκσ is the unique the interior
b κσ is the unique interior solution to Y = Y (qD ) ;
solution to qD = qκσ ; D
and N0 , N1 , qκσ , Y (q) are as stated in Proposition 3.

Upon inspection, it should be clear Proposition 4 bears a striking resemblance to Proposition 3. Indeed, it turns out that within our framework, solving
for the optimal damages D∗ is a “mathematical dual” to the problem of solving
for the optimal fractional entitlement q ∗ .98 Thus, if an optimal fractional entitlement would give each party a partial entitlement to the asset (i.e., q ∗ ∈ (0, 1)),
the optimal liability rule would similarly prescribe a moderate quantum of damages, designed speciÞcally to deter some–but not all–appropriations. Because
of this duality, all of the Þndings from Proposition 3 carry over (subject to a
simple transformation) to a world of liability rules.99
Table 2 describes the qualitative relationship between the optimal damages
and other deep parameters of the model. As with fractional entitlements and
undivided property rules, it is clear once again that the optimal liability rule
continues to turn on a comparison of the parties’ relative marginal abilities to
enhance consumer goodwill. When the comparative advantage sits one-sidedly
with the employer (Region 1), the optimal rule tends toward a pro-employer
property rule, and vice versa when the employee has the one-sided advantage
(Region 3). However, when the parties’ relative skills are commensurate with
one another (Region 2), the optimal liability rule imposes interior damages,
and thus would envision at least some appropriations for suﬃciently large realizations of v. Note also from the table that in a world of liability rules, the
employee’s wealth constraint does not militate in favor of pro-employer property
entitlements.100 At best, a binding wealth constraint simply implies that the
level of damages be increased (perhaps from zero) to the point where the wealth
constraint no longer is binding.

Y (qD ) not binding
Y (qD ) binding

Region 1
θ
1−θ < N0
Prop. Rule: B
n/a101

Region 2
θ
≤ N1
N0 ≤ 1−θ
Liab. Rule
Liab. Rule

Region 3
θ
1−θ > N1
Prop. Rule: A
Liab. Rule

Table 2
98 This

result is proven in Lemma C, which can be found in the appendix.
conjecture that this duality result carries over to other continuous distributional assumptions on v (beyond exponential) that exhibit monotone hazard rates in the parties’ joint
eﬀort. As of now, however, this assertion remains a conjecture.
Moreover, it should be noted that this duality need not exist in all contexts. Ayres and
Talley (1995), for example, compare fractional entitlements and liability rules within a Coasean
environment with two-sided incomplete information and no investment. In such a setting, this
duality result no longer holds.
100 The same caveat applies here as in note , supra.
101 So long as Assumption 1 holds, the agent’s wealth constraint will never bind with a
pro-principal property rule.
99 We
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Hence, once again there is no a priori reason to think that “most” employment arrangements will fall in the Northwest cell of the above table. Indeed,
just as in the previous subsection, contractual environments that are likely to
fall outside Region 1 include those in which:
• The employee possesses even moderate skills at building up goodwill (i.e.,
θ
1−θ is not too small);
• Post-termination competition between employer and employee is not too
destructive and/or inter se transaction costs are small (i.e., κ is large);
and
• The employer either is partially eﬀective at retaining existing customers in
the face of competition with the employee and/or she has a large amount
of ex post bargaining power (i.e., σ is relatively small).
Because choosing among damages rules is a mathematical dual to choosing
among fractional property rights, entitlements protected by a liability rule represent a viable and legitimate policy option when fractional entitlement schemes
are unavailable. Indeed, liability regimes do not require the court to ‘divide the
baby’ explicitly. They do they require the creation and maintenance of an uncertain, probabilistic doctrine. They do not even require that the court take
into account any information beyond that needed to assign an undivided property right optimally.102 Rather, all a liability rule requires is that the court be
able to identify when an employee is utilizing trade secrets to compete with the
former employer.

4

Caveats and Extensions

While the previous section has made a number of interesting and pertinent observations, for the sake of presentation we have not tarried long in addressing
various caveats to both our theoretical analysis and the doctrinal applications
thereof. This section explores four such caveats. First, we note that the duality
between fractional entitlements and liability rules demonstrated above can also
be extended to mixed regimes, involving compound compositions of entitlement
regimes. Second, we discuss one of the principal doctrinal implications of this
duality result: the under-determinacy of an ‘optimal’ doctrine. Third, we address whether (and to what extent) ordinary courts could be expected, given
well-recognized administrative constraints, to be able to implement the various
divided entitlement regimes noted above. And Þnally, we ask how extending
the model to a dynamic framework may aﬀect our results.
102 Note, like Propositions 2 and 3, all that Proposition 4 requires is knowledge of the deep
parameters θ, κ, σ,and Y.
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4.1

Mixed Regimes

One of the most interesting results from the previous section is that fractional
entitlements and liability rules constitute theoretical duals from an optimal
contracting standpoint. Any incentive compatible, individually rational contract
that is implementable using a fractional rule q ∗ is also implementable using a
corresponding damages rule D∗ , and vice versa.
As it turns out, it is possible to generalize this statement even further to
admit various mixed regimes of property and liability rules. Consider, for instance, a probabilistic legal rule that assigns ownership to the employer with
probability (1 − q) , and gives the employee an entitlement to compete freely
with probability q. Moreover, suppose that when the entitlement is assigned to
the employer, it is protected – not by the spectre of an injunction – but rather
by a strict liability rule with damages D. From the previous section, we know
that it is possible to represent the liability rule by its dual: a fractional assignment of shares qD and (1 − qD ) , respectively, to the employee and employer.
And thus, the mixed regime hypothesized above is equivalent (from an eﬃciency
perspective) to a simple probabilistic assignment in which the employer receives
an undivided property right with probability (1 − qD ) · (1 − q) , and otherwise
the employee receives an entitlement to compete freely. This reasoning (in a
more general form) is reßected in the following corollary:
Corollary 1: Any probabilistic mixture of N distinct liability rules {D1 , D2 , ..., DN }
M
∈ <N
can
+ and M distinct fractional assignments {q1 , q2 , ..., qM } ∈ [0, 1]
be represented by a single fractional entitlement assignment qMN ∈ [0, 1] .
As Corollary 1 states, the duality result from the previous section is rather
generalizable and powerful. This observation is important for both analytical
and practical reasons. From an analytical perspective, it suggests that modeling the optimal legal rule as a choice among fractional entitlements does not
‘miss’ important considerations implicit within a more complex universe of rules.
But moreover, from a practical perspective, it suggests that uncertainty about
damages under a liability rule may play a similar role as that played by the
uncertainty about the identity of the entitlement holder analyzed above. Thus,
when a probabilistic property right would be optimal but diﬃcult to maintain,
there may be other dimensions (e.g., damages) where systematic uncertainty is
signiÞcantly more durable and does an equally good job.
In theory, it would be possible to generalize Corollary 1 even further to
include other forms of entitlement not considered here. So long as the employee’s
wealth constraint does not bind, Corollary 1 carries over to a vast array of even
more ‘exotic’ option-like entitlements, such as giving A a ‘put’ (rather than a
call) option on the trade secret, allowing him to force payment from B in the
event that A abstains from appropriating the asset.103 We do not address such
entitlement forms here, however, for two reasons. First, such schemes are so far
103 Indeed, a number of other exotic-sounding entitlement forms are possible. See Ayres &
Goldbart (2000) for a synopsis.
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from what one observes in practice that their implementation would require a
signiÞcant overhaul of existing doctrine. And second, while they are equivalent
on incentive grounds, put rules such as this are distributionally non-neutral,
and many of them would require that the employee post a signiÞcantly larger
bond ex ante in exchange for his entitlement to a larger downstream portion of
rents – a bond that would frequently violate his wealth constraint.

4.2

The Duality Dilemma

A second caveat worth mentioning explicitly deals with the darker ßip-side of
duality. Indeed, as Corollary 1 states, there is an inÞnite continuum of hybrid
fractional and liability-rule entitlements that are outcome equivalent. While
such added degrees of freedom are emancipating for theoreticians, they pose
some particularly stark diﬃculties for legal doctrine. Explicitly, the duality of
fractional entitlements and liability rules implies the absence of a unique ‘model
code’ approach to an optimal doctrine. Consider, for example, the framework
from the previous section, in which we arbitrarily set σ = κ = 1, θ = 1/2, and
Y > Y (1) . It is easily veriÞed that the optimal liability rule in this case is given
by D∗ = 0.42, and that the optimal fractional assignment is given by q ∗ = 0.5.
Both of these entitlement schemes achieve equivalent levels of social welfare
(ESW = 3/16), which – as it turns out – is the best one can accomplish
when a and b are not veriÞable. As such, it is conceivable that two jurisdictions
could adopt entirely diﬀerent legal regimes – one imposing a fractional (e.g.,
probabilistic) set of property rules, the other imposing a moderate yet certain
liability rule – yet both jurisdictions would have adopted an ‘optimal’ doctrine.
Because of this indeterminacy, it is more diﬃcult (and perhaps impossible) for
us to conjure up single, doctrinal soundbite for judges or legislators to follow
while searching for “the” optimal doctrine.
Nevertheless, doctrinal duality does not prevent us from saying anything at
all about the question. Indeed, no matter how a court decides to protect trade
secrets, our analysis suggests that its decision about the strength of such protection will ultimately hinge on a number of common considerations, including
(1) the marginal abilities of the employee relative to the employer at enhancing
goodwill; (2) the extent to which, if protection to the employer is denied, ensuing
competition is likely to dissipate rents; (3) the likely market shares of the litigants in such a competition; and (4) whether the employee’s wealth constraint is
prohibitive. Moreover, in cases where factors (1) through (4) are relatively close
calls and could thus cut either way, our analysis suggests that some form of intermediate protection is probably optimal. In such circumstances, our analysis
counsels against what (we perceive to be) the predominant trend in trade secret
law – that is, clear, unambiguous property rules favoring employers whenever
a valuable informational asset exists.
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4.3

Practical Administration

Although transaction cost approaches to legal doctrine can be extremely informative, they often suﬀer from having unrealistic expectations about what courts
are able to accomplish within their administrative constraints. Indeed, as one
of us has previously written,104 these expectations may constitute a principal
weakness of the transaction cost approach.
It should not be surprising, then, that similar administrative concerns implicate our analysis. For even if one assumes the importance of the analytical
points elucidated above, to implement them would require a court to measure
a number of factors (i.e., the ‘deep’ parameters in our model) which may not
be readily apparent. Such inquiries may somewhat technical and complicated,
particularly in situations that are typical of trade secret cases. One might have
misgivings that these evidentiary requirements would, at least in some cases,
demand too much of the judicial process.
This objection is not insigniÞcant. Indeed, the diﬃculty of verifying certain
aspects of parties’ behavior is, in fact, a motivating premise of this paper. Such
veriÞcation problems might easily plague other important factual determinations as well. At the same time, however, it is important to realize that this
objection–plausible though it may be–is perhaps less problematic for our enterprise than it Þrst appears. Indeed, recall that our model explicitly assumed
that a number of relevant considerations (i.e., the values of a, b, and v) were simply unveriÞable in court. As such, our informational assumptions about what
courts can realistically accomplish already pushes in the direction of modesty.
To be sure, one might argue that courts have even more limited resources
than those that we implicitly presume here. Many courts, for example, may have
extreme diﬃculties in verifying the other deep parameters of the problem which
are central to assessing factors (1) through (4) in the previous subsection.105
However, whatever the plausibility of this argument, it hardly constitutes a
defense of the status quo. Indeed, as demonstrated above, even an optimal
undivided property regime hinges crucially on every single one of the above
factors. Were some/all of those factors unveriÞable to courts, it simply does
not follow that the optimal form of protection defaults back to a pro-employer
property right. Indeed, there is no a priori reason to believe that such a regime
would dominate any other, and some reason to believe things could easily cut
the other way.106 Hence, the argument that courts might have a diﬃcult time
implementing our doctrinal proposals doctrine would seem to apply a fortiori
to the existing legal regime. Viewed from this perspective, our approach represents an important Þrst step (though perhaps a tentative one) in understanding
how trade secret law could–and should–be more sensitive to the underlying
environment.
104 See

Lester (2000).
is, θ, κ, σ, w, and F.
106 For instance, as noted in Propositions 3 and 4, the employee’s wealth constraints to not
generally imply the optimality of a pro-employer property rule when fractional entitlements
and liability rules are available.
105 That
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4.4

Dynamics

One potentially large limitation of the foregoing analysis is that is static in nature. Indeed, in the model presented in Section 2, the Þrm lasted but for a single
period. Consequently, investments made during that period were appropriable
only once. What happened after the dust settled mattered little. In more realistic settings, however, a stock of goodwill is built up over time, and the parties
make incremental decisions about whether to contribute to it or draw from it.
One might justiÞably wonder, then, how our analysis would change (if at all) in
a dynamic setting.
Although we do not present a formal analysis here,107 dynamic concerns can
signiÞcantly aﬀect our normative prescriptions. Nevertheless, we predict that
they would do so in a relatively predictable and monotone way. In particular, we
conjecture that dynamic considerations imply an optimal doctrine that initially
grants strong (property-like) protection to employers, but progressively comes
to favor the employee during the lifetime of the disputed asset. The reasons for
our conjecture are as follows.
First, and most centrally, in practice the non-protection of a trade secret is
frequently a type of one-way policy ratchet. If, at some period t, the prevailing legal rule permitted an employee to appropriate a trade secret for himself,
it would be diﬃcult to ‘undo’ that allocation in a subsequent period by reendowing the employer with a property right over the asset. Indeed, one of the
potential reasons that competition dissipates rents in our static model is that
other, third party competitors may become privy to the information and use it
to enter the market. It would be diﬃcult (if not impossible) for a court to eﬀectively corral the use of such knowledge once it had entered the public domain.
This ratcheting eﬀect thus implies that a more cautious (i.e., pro-employer)
posture is particularly desirable for newly-created informational assets.
Compounding this eﬀect is the observation that many trade secrets have a
durable character. Investments that build up a consumer goodwill today will
likely enhance it tomorrow as well (subject, perhaps, to some small rate of decay). Consequently, an optimal dynamic doctrine would attempt to induce both
parties to invest during the crucial early life of the asset. Given the irreversibility of non-protection, however, the only way to give both parties such incentives
in a sustainable way is to divide the entitlement over time – giving a large share
of the rents during early periods (through strong protection), but allowing the
employee a greater share in later periods (through weakened protection).
A third factor that would lead to the dynamic doctrine we posit is the fact
that the employee’s wealth constraint may well become less relevant over time.
Indeed, as time passes, the employee may be able to aﬀord contributing a small
fraction of her per-period wage back to the Þrm – the accumulation of which
can constitute a type of performance bond against subsequent appropriations.
Accordingly, over time, a number of eﬃcient (but employee-friendly) contracts
that theretofore would not have been implementable because of the employee’s
wealth constraint may now arrive back on the table.
107 A

later version of this paper will most likely include one.
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And Þnally, we posit that within many (if not most) contexts where customer
goodwill grows over time, the employee may progressively become a more pivotal
Þgure in the asset’s continued growth and maintenance. This is, in many ways,
a simple observation about marketing. Many of the important employer-borne
investments – such as advertising, market research, etc. – tend to particularly
good at attracting new customers. However, once these customers are “in the
door,” their continued loyalty increasingly turns on the perceived quality of
service they are receiving – a dimension of quality that seems frequently to
be the predominant province of employee-borne investments. In terms of the
model
´ from Section 2, then, this form of dynamic concern would suggest that
³
θ
increases as time passes. As such, even if one dismissed all of the other
1−θ
dynamic issues presented above, an optimal static contract between A and B
repeated over time would come incrementally to favor the employee over the
employer.
Surprisingly, the sort of doctrine that these dynamic considerations suggest
is, in at least some respects, even more inconsistent with current practice. Indeed, as we noted in the introduction, an employer’s prospects for protecting
her trade secrets often grow stronger as the required “time and eﬀort” to build
up the trade secret increases.108 Our arguments, in contrast, would suggest
that as a “goodwill asset” ages, courts should increasingly disfavor continued
protection. At the same time, however, many of the evidentiary inputs that
such a dynamic doctrine would require are virtually the same as those noted in
the earlier sections. Hence, while dynamic considerations would indeed change
our results, they would neither render irrelevant the considerations advocated
in the previous section, nor would they militate (in our minds) in favor of the
status quo.

5

Conclusion

In this article, we have argued that existing law governing trade secrets (and
related doctrines) is a poor Þt in contexts where both employers and highlyskilled employees can make investments that produce informational goods (such
as detailed customer lists). In particular, we have argued, the existing norm of
strong property rules is poorly tailored to bring about the type of joint investment that such environments tend to invite. Consequently, eﬃciency-minded
courts would be wise to consider broadening the scope of their inquiry beyond
the binary choice between ‘full protection’ and ‘no protection,’ and should consider various partial entitlements, such as fractional assignments, liability rules,
or even some combination thereof, as possible alternatives. Moreover, we have
argued, an optimal doctrine in such a context would likely have a dynamic ßavor
that similarly diverges from current practice, granting progressively less solicitude to the claims of the employer during the lifetime of the disputed asset.
While the reforms we advocate are non-trivial, we have argued that they need
108 See

TAN
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, supra.
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not be so administratively demanding (at least relative to the status quo) to be
prohibitive.
There are, of course, a number of potential extensions to our analysis that
we have left unexplored (at least for now). For instance, if we are correct that
current law is a poor Þt in mutual-investment contexts, one would expect to observe numerous attempts by employers and employees to implement alternatiuve
allocations through contract. While casual observation suggest that this is, in
fact, a relatively common practice,109 a more rigorous empirical investigation
would be helpful.
In addition, a subsequent analysis might explore how various non-rational
heuristics and cognitive biases would aﬀect our analysis. Though our thoughts
are still nascent about such eﬀects, we suspect that at least certain cognitive
errors may actually lend support to our normative thesis. Suppose, for example, that in the framework developed in Section 2, the employee’s relative skills
at enhancing goodwill were ‘just’ insuﬃcient (in the absence of bias) to justify
abandoning a pro-employer property rule.110 Suppose further, however, that
the employee ‘suﬀered’ from a bias that caused him to make probabilistic assessments reßecting unjustiÞed optimism about small probabilities of success
(and, perhaps, unjustiÞed pessimism about large probabilities of success).111
Consider once again whether a pro-employer property rule would remain preferable to (say) an alternative, probabilistic entitlement, favoring the employer
ninety-nine times out of a hundred, but favoring the employee the remaining one
percent of the time. The alternative régime would not signiÞcantly reduce employer investments in goodwill; but the employee’s overconÞdence would cause
her to increase her own investment inframarginally, as if she had a greater than
one-percent chance of receiving the ultimate entitlement. In such situations,
then, the threshold at which the employee’s relative skills justify fractional entitlements would become discernibly more accommodating.112
Finally, we have not ventured into a general welfare analysis of various legal
entitlements considered above, assuming throughout that the social objective
was to maximize the expected joint payoﬀs to the contracting parties. A wel109 A number of litigated cases, for example, involve express non-compete clauses protected
not by speciÞc performance, but rather by moderate liquidated damages terms. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Deeter 913 P.2d 1272 (Nev. 1996) (Restrictive covenant for CEO protected by a
$50,000 liquidated damages term). Moore v. Eggers Consulting Co., Inc. 562 N.W.2d 534
(Neb. 1997) ($100 liquidated damages term breach of non-compete clause); Management
Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763, (Colo.App.,1988); Mesarvey, Russell &
Co. v. Boyer 1992 WL 185656 Ohio App. 10 Dist. (1992); Mesarvey, Russell & Co. v.
Boyer 1992 WL 185656 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.,1992); Bellboy Seafood Corp. v. Nathanson 410
N.W.2d 349 Minn.App. (1987).
110 E.g., θ = N
b − ε, for some arbitrarily small ε.
1−θ
111 In technical terms, for some inÞnitessimal probability ε, the employee acted as if he utilized
a probability ‘weighing’ function π(ε) such that limε→0 π(ε) >> 0, and limε→1 π (ε) << 1.
See, e.g., Thaler (1991), at 141.
112 A similar analysis might also pertain to the damages manifest in liability rules. Of course,
if the employer were subject to the opposite trend, the optimal judicial determination would
come down to ascertaining whether the employee’s unjustiÞed optimism outweighed the employer’s unjustiÞed pessimism.
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fare economics extension might prove tricky, but may lead to some interesting
insights. For instance, we have assumed throughout that non-protection of an
employer’s trade secret will tend to dissipate the aggregate rents available to the
parties once they go into competition with one another. In reality, such rents do
not actually “disappear,” but rather are transferred (super-additively) to other
producers and to consumers. Viewed alone, such a consideration would militate
in favor of even weaker trade secret protections. At the same time, however, the
additional rent dissipation caused by such weaker protections would dampen
both parties’ ex ante incentives to invest to begin with. Complicating issues
further is the fact that the ‘beneÞt’ side of this putative trade-oﬀ is at least
slightly deceptive. Indeed, one would need to be sure that the phenomenon we
have identiÞed as “goodwill” is a meaningful measure of consumer welfare. To
be one, it must actually proxy for some bona Þde enhancement in value (because, say, of better-tailored services or more informed consumers) rather than a
transitory manipulation of preferences that should receive little or no normative
weight.113 Such questions, while interesting, we leave for future work.

6
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Appendix

This appendix states and presents the proofs for various propositions that appear in the text.
Proposition 2: Consider the binary choice among entitlements q ∈ {0, 1}.
The optimal entitlement, q ∗ , is given by:
½
θ
b and Y ≥ Yb
1 if 1−θ
≥N
,
q∗ =
0 else
b≡
where N

³

σ 2 +κ−2 −1
σ·(2−σ)

´ 12

³
and Yb ≡ F −κ2 (1 − σ) σθ 2 +
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(1−σ)
2

´
(1 − θ)2 .

Proof: Consider Þrst a property rule favoring B. It is easily conÞrmed
that in such a situation only the employer will invest, investing b∗ = 1 − θ. This
choice will lead to an expected social welfare level of:
(1 − θ)2
,
2
which necessarily must weakly exceed (w +F ) for the parties’ participation constraints to hold. Moreover,
for each
i party’s individual participation constraints,
h
2
−
F
. Note that regardless of w, both parties’ inwe must have w ∈ w, (1−θ)
2
centive constraints are trivially satisÞed at {0, b∗ } . Finally, since w ≥ w > −Y,
the employee’s wealth constraint is never binding here. Now consider the situation where the property rule favors A, and ignore A’s wealth constraint for
the moment. In this case, employee will succeed in luring the customer with
probability σ, but in the process the total available surplus for whoever wins
shrinks to κ·v. Viewed from the time of investment, then, the players’ respective
payoﬀs are given by:
2

π A (a, b) = w + σ · κ · (θa + (1 − θ)b) − a2
π B (a, b) = −w + (1 − σ) · κ · (θa + (1 − θ)b) −

b2
2

The equilibrium levels of investment are easily conÞrmed as a∗ = σ · κ · θ and
b∗ = (1 − σ) · κ · (1 − θ) , so that the expected social welfare is equal to:
(a∗ )2 (b∗ )2
−
κ · (θ · a∗ + (1 − θ) · b∗ ) −
2 µ 2 ¶
µ
¶
2−σ
1+σ
2
2
= σ·
· (κ · θ) + (1 − σ) ·
· (κ · (1 − θ))
2
2
Comparing this expression the welfare under the pro-employer rule yields the
expression given in the proposition. Just as before, a necessary condition for
such an entitlement to be individually rational is that the above expression
must weakly exceed (w + F ), which will always be satisÞed if Assumption 1
holds. However, for the individual participation constraints to be satisÞed, the
wage must be such that the employer and employee each can receive at least
their opportunity costs of participation. Ignoring wealth constraints, it is easily
veriÞed that the wage paid to the employee, w, must fall within the interval
deÞned by:

w−σ·

µ

2−σ
2

¶

2

· (κ · θ) ≤ w ≤ (1 − σ) ·

µ

1+σ
2

¶

2
· (κ · (1 − θ)) − F

(This is a well-deÞned interval so long as Assumption 1 holds). Nothing presented thus far, however, prevents the upper bound this interval from taking on
negative values. In such circumstances, A would have to pre-pay for the prospective chance of appropriating goodwill, yet at the same time he can aﬀord to pay
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at most Y dollars. Thus, even when optimal, the property assignment deÞned
above is not implementable unless B’s rationality constraint can also be satisÞed at the lowest possible wage of w = −Y. Equivalently, the pro-employee
entitlement is implementable only if:
µ
¶
(1 − σ)
2
2
2
· (1 − θ) ≡ Yb ,
Y ≥ F − (1 − σ) · κ · σ · θ +
2

which constitutes the second condition in the proposition. Note that the right
hand side of this constraint is strictly decreasing in κ, and strictly increasing in
F, σ, and θ.¥
Proposition 3: Consider the choice among fractional entitlements q ∈ [0, 1].
The optimal entitlement, q ∗ , is given by:

θ
0
if 1−θ
< N0



θ
1
if
1−θ > N1 and Y ≥ Y (1)
q∗ =
, where
θ

q
if

1−θ ∈ [N0 , N1 ] and Y ≥ Y (qκσ )
 κσ
qbκσ else
·
¸
³ −1 ´ 12
¡ 1 ¢ ³ θ ´2
N0 ≡ κ σ−1 ;
− N0
σκ ·
1−θ

 ³ σ2 +κ−1 −1 ´ 12
qκσ ≡
³
´2
1
if κ > 2−σ ;
θ
σ·(2−σ−κ−1 )
N1 ≡
(1 − N02 ) + 1−θ
(1 + 2N0 )
 ∞
else
and qbκσ is the unique root of the equation Y = Y (q).

Proof: Disregard the parties’ participation constraints for now. For any
q, expected social welfare is given by:
a2 b2
−
2
2
Because q endogenously aﬀects a and b, one must Þrst impose incentive compatibility on the above expression before optimizing over q. As noted in the text,
the players’ respective payoﬀ functions are:
S(q) = (1 − q + qκ) · (θa + (1 − θ)b) −

2

πA (a, b) = w + (q · σ · κ) · (θa + (1 − θ)b) − a2
πB (a, b) = −w + ((1 − q) + q · (1 − σ) · κ) · (θa + (1 − θ) b) −

b2
2

For any q ∈ [0, 1] , the equilibrium investments are easily veriÞed as a∗ =
(q · σ · κ) · θ and b∗ = ((1 − q) + q · (1 − σ) · κ) · (1 − θ) , so that the expected
social welfare is equal to:
(a∗ )2 (b∗ )2
−
S(q) = (1 − q + q · κ) · (θ · a∗ + (1 − θ) · b∗ ) −
2
2
´
³
q·κ·σ
2
= θ ·q·σ·κ· 1−q+q·κ−
2
2
+ (1 − θ) · ((1 − q) + q · (1 − σ) · κ) ×
µ
¶
((1 − q) + q · (1 − σ) · κ)
1−q+q·κ−
2
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Note that S(q) is quadratic in q, and thus it is either globally concave or convex. Consider Þrst the case of q = 0, and ask whether it is locally optimal.
0
Diﬀerentiating
³
´ S(q) and manipulating yields the result that S (0) < 0 if and
θ
only if 1−θ
< N0 , where N0 is as given in the Proposition. Thus, if this
condition holds, q = 0 is a local maximum, and, if S(q) is concave, then q = 0
is a global maximum. On the other hand, if S(q) is convex, then q = 1 is also a
local maximum and a candidate for a global maximum. However, from Proposition´2, we know that q = 0 dominates q = 1 on optimality grounds whenever
³
θ
b . And, since N0 < N
b , q = 0 must constitute a global maximum
< N
1−θ
´
³
θ
< N0 .
when 1−θ
Now consider Þrst the case of q = 1, and ask under what conditions it is
locally optimal. Diﬀerentiating S(q) and manipulating yields the result that
¢2
¡
−2
> σ(2κ−1−σκ)
. When the numerator
S 0 (1) < 0 if and only if 1−θ
θ
(1−κ+κσ 2 ) ≡ (N1 )
of the right hand side fraction in the inequality is strictly positive,
simply
take
³
´
θ
square roots of both sides and invert to yield the condition 1−θ > N1 as
given in the theorem. When the numerator is negative, however, the N1 is not
deÞned. It is easily conÞrmed that S(q) is concave in this region, and thus local
optimality suﬃces for global optimality.³
´
θ
∈ [N0 , N1 ]. Diﬀerentiating S(q)
Finally, consider situations where 1−θ
produces Þrst order conditions from which the expression for q (σ, κ) emerges.
´
³
θ
>
The Þrst order conditions are suﬃcient because S(q) is strictly concave ∀ 1−θ
N0 , a condition that holds in this region by hypothesis.
In all of the above derivations, we have assumed that the parties’ participation constraints were not binding. However, the condition for individual
2
> w + F, which is implied by Assumprationality when q = 1 is simple: (1−θ)
2
tion 1. Moreover, because this inequality always holds at q = 1, then it will also
hold for the optimal q, even if it diﬀers from 1. However, for lower values of q,
the employee’s wealth constraint may be binding; if it is, there is a maximal q
satisfying the employer’s individual rationality constraint at w = Y, such that
πB (a∗ , b∗ ) = 0. It is easily conÞrmed that this value for q is given by the root of
Y = Y (q), which has only one positive root in [0, 1] , thus yielding the expression
for qbκσ given in the text.¥
Lemma B: Investment choices of eﬀort a∗ and b∗ are incentive compatible under a given liability rule D ∈ [0, ∞) if and only if the following conditions
are satisÞed:
(ICA )
a = θ · (σκ) · (1 + ρ (a, b)) · e−ρ(a,b)
i
h
b = (1 − θ) · 1 − (1 − κ + σκ) · e−ρ(a,b) · (1 + ρ (a, b)) .
(ICB )
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Proof: Begin with A, and recall that his ex ante expected payoﬀ is given
by:
a2
,
2
i
h
θ
= e−ρ(a,b) · ρ(a, b) (θa+(1−θ)b)

π A (a, b) = w + (σκ) · (θa + (1 − θ)b) · e−ρ(a,b) −
D·(σκ)−1
(θa+(1−θ)b) .

d −ρ(a,b)
Note at this point that da
e
i
h
(1−θ)
d −ρ(a,b)
−ρ(a,b)
· ρ(a, b) (θa+(1−θ)b) .The employee will there, and that db e
=− e
fore choose a ≥ 0 to maximize π A (a, b), which – for an interior choice of a –
implies the following Þrst order condition:

where ρ (a, b) =

a = θ · (σκ) · (1 + ρ (a, b)) · e−ρ(a,b)

(8)

Similarly, B’s expected payoﬀ, πB (a, b), is given by:

i
h
b2
πB (a, b) = 1 − (1 − κ + σκ) · e−ρ(a,b) (θa + (1 − θ)b) − w −
2

And thus, the employer will choose b ≥ 0 to maximize π B (a, b), and accordingly, his optimal choice – if interior – must satisfy the following Þrst-order
condition:
i
h
(9)
b = (1 − θ) · 1 − (1 − κ + σκ) · e−ρ(a,b) · (1 + ρ (a, b)) .

The above Þrst order conditions will characterize the equilibrium only if
they adequately describe the players’ strategies in all possible environments. In
other words, we need to be sure that neither player is at a corner solution in
her investment choice. Thus, let us begin with A’s choice. Fix any b = b ≥ 0.
The Þrst order condition in (8) becomes:
¡
¡ ¢¢
(10)
a = θ · (σκ) · 1 + ρ a, b · e−ρ(a,b)

Because A’s expected payoﬀ is concave,
¡ ¢ this also a suﬃcient condition for any
interior maximum. Noting that ρ a, b ∈ [0, ∞), it is easily conÞrmed that
the right hand side of the above expression is always non-negative, and thus
the marginal expected beneÞt to the employee of investment is always nonnegative. Moreover, because the marginal cost of investment at a = 0 is also zero,
the solution a∗ of (8) is always nonnegative, even when not constrained to be
so. Therefore, if the employee is ever at a corner solution of a∗ = 0, it will
be one that is ‘just’ binding rather than strictly binding, and hence (8) fully
characterizes her strategy.
Now consider B’s choice. Fix some a = a ≥ 0. Now, the FOC in (9) becomes:
b = (1 − θ) · [1 − (1 − κ + σκ) exp {−ρ (a, b)} · (1 + ρ (a, b))] .

Now, similar the earlier case, to show that the optimal choice of b is always nonnegative, we must demonstrate that the right hand side of the above expression
is always nonnegative. Equivalently, we must show:
1 ≥ (1 − κ + σκ) exp {−ρ (a, 0)} · (1 + ρ (a, 0))
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(11)

To do so, we presume Þrst that B is at an interior solution.114 We then characterize it; and show that above condition can only be satisÞed by some b∗ ≥ 0,
thereby validating our presumption. Hence, if both parties are at interior solutions, we know from (8) and (9) that the following relationship exists between
the parties optimal choices:
1 − b/(1 − θ)
a/θ
= e−ρ(a,b) · (1 + ρ (a, b)) =
σκ
(1 − κ + σκ)
Solving for a yields:
σκ
a(b) =
(1 − κ + σκ)

µ
θ−

¶
θ
b
(1 − θ)

Substituting this into the deÞnition of ρ (a, b) gives:
ρ (a(b), b) = ³
σκ
θ2 (1−κ+σκ)
−

D · (σκ)−1

θ2
σκ
(1−θ) b (1−κ+σκ)

´.
+ (1 − θ)b

Now, B’s solution will be interior if (11) is satisÞed at b = 0. Evaluating ρ (.) at
this point yields:
D (1 − κ + σκ)
;
ρ (a(0), 0) = 2
θ
(σκ)2
Substituting this expression into (11), we wish to demonstrate that:
(
) Ã
!
D (1 − κ + σκ)
D (1 − κ + σκ)
1 ≥ (1 − κ + σκ) exp − 2
· 1+ 2
θ
θ
(σκ)2
(σκ)2
which is equivalent to
1
≥ e−Dξ (1 + Dξ)
(1 − κ + σκ)
where ξ = (1−κ+σκ)
> 0. While this expression clearly holds for some valθ2 (σκ)2
ues of D, to determine whether it holds globally we must Þnd the sharpest
bound
of the right-hand
side of the above expression. To this end, note that
¡ −Dξ
¢
2 −Dξ
d
e
(1
+
Dξ)
=
−ξ
e
D < 0, and thus the sharpest bound is at D = 0.
dD
Evaluating (11) at this point yields:
1
≥1
(1 − κ + σκ)
which is clearly satisÞed ∀(σ, κ) ∈ [0, 1]2 . Thus, the right hand side of (9) is
non-negative, and B is always at either an interior solution or a corner solution
that is ‘just’ binding.¥
Using Lemma B, we now state and prove a related lemma that is we use to
prove Proposition 4:
114 Actually, we assume an interior solution for both parties. But from the above analysis,
we know this is always true for A.
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Lemma C: For any liability rule D and equilibrium investments a∗ (D) and
b∗ (D), there exists a unique fractional entitlement qD with associated
equilibrium investments b
a (qD ) and bb (qD ) such that a∗ (D) = b
a (qD ) and
∗
b
b (D) = b (qD ) .

Proof: From the analysis of fractional entitlements in Subsection 3. , we
a (0) = 0 to b
a (1) =
know that b
a (qD ) is continuous and strictly increasing from b
b
σκθ. Likewise, we know that b (qD ) is continuous and strictly decreasing from
bb (0) = (1 − θ) to bb (1) = κ (1 − σ) (1 − θ). As such, we can deÞne their inverse
functions b
a−1 (.) and bb−1 (.) as follows:
a
σ·κ·θ
bb−1 (b) = qb = 1 − b/ (1 − θ)
(1 − (1 − σ) · κ)

b
a−1 (a) = qa =

Equilibrium of this game also means equilibrium of these inverse functions, and
thus b
a−1 (a) = qa = qb = bb−1 (b) . In turn, this observation implies that for every
value of qD :
1 − b (qD ) / (1 − θ)
a (qD ) /θ
=
(12)
(σκ)
(1 − κ + σκ)
Now consider a liability rule D. From Lemma 4, we know that the players’
Þrst order conditions fully characterize the equilibrium. Combining these Þrst
order conditions yields the following condition, which must always be satisÞed
at equilibrium {a∗ (D) , b∗ (D)}for every value of D :
1 − b∗ (D) /(1 − θ)
a∗ (D) /θ
=
(σκ)
(1 − κ + σκ)

(13)

Note that (12) and (13) are identical. Clearly, then, the relationship between
a∗ and b∗ is identical to the relationship between b
a (qD ) and bb (qD ) . Similarly,
∗
we know that under a liability rule D, lim a (D) = σκθ, lim a∗ (D) = 0,
D→0

D→∞

lim b∗ (D) = κ (1 − σ) (1 − θ), and lim b∗ (D) = (1 − θ), and that the Þrst

D→0

D→∞

order conditions deÞned by (8) and (9) are everywhere continuous and Þnite
for all D. Jointly, these observations imply a pair of continuous equilibrium
a (qD ) and bb (qD ) . Therefore,
strategies a∗ (D) and b∗ (D) over the same range as b
we know that there must exist at least one value of qD that implements the same
investment levels as D. To show that qD is unique, one may simply invoke the
implicit function theorem on (8) and (9) to show that a∗ (D) and b∗ (D) are
strictly decreasing and increasing, respectively, in D.¥
Proposition 4: Consider the choice among liability rule entitlements D ∈
[0, ∞), and the associated equilibrium investment strategies a∗ and b∗ deÞned by (ICA ) and (ICB ) in Lemma B. The optimal level of damages,
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D∗ , is characterized by:

∞


 0
D∗ =
D


 κσ
b κσ
D
∗

θ
if 1−θ
< N0
θ
if 1−θ
> N1 and Y ≥ Y (1)
θ
∈ [N0 , N1 ] and Y ≥ Y (qD )
if 1−θ
else

,

∗

where qD = e−ρ(a ,b ) · (1 + ρ (a∗ , b∗ )) ; Dκσ is the unique the interior
b κσ is the unique interior solution to Y = Y (qD ) ;
solution to qD = qκσ ; D
and N0 , N1 , qκσ , Y (q) are as stated in Proposition 3.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Proposition 3. Because of Lemma
C, we know that for every value of D, there is a dual problem using a unique
probabilistic entitlement qD . Hence, all that is necessary is to specify the approθ
< N0 , the optimal
priate transformations between D and qD . Clearly, when 1−θ
value of qD = 0, giving the employer the undivided property right, which is consistent with a value of D∗ = ∞, which has the same eﬀect. Conversely, when
θ
1−θ > N1 , the optimal value of qD = 1, giving the employee an unencumbered
entitlement to use the trade secret., which is equivalent to D∗ = 0. Recall from
the Þrst order conditions under a liability rule D, that:
∗ ∗
1 − b/(1 − θ)
a/θ
= e−ρ(a ,b ) · (1 + ρ (a∗ , b∗ )) =
.
σκ
(1 − κ + σκ)

(14)

However, we also know that under a fractional entitlement q,
1 − b/(1 − θ)
a/θ
=q=
σκ
(1 − κ + σκ)

(15)

Clearly then, the fractional value that constitutes the dual to damages D is given
∗ ∗
by q = qD = e−ρ(a ,b ) · (1 + ρ (a∗ , b∗ )) . Applying this transformation to the
expressions for qκσ and qbκσ yields the remaining expressions in the proposition.¥
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